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Overview of Rules of Professional Conduct
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 1, 1985, the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct
(RPC) became effective. Despite a number of significant differences, I the
RPC are virtually identical to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules), adopted by the American Bar Association (ABA) in
August 1983. Most practicing attorneys are unable to keep up to date in this
area in light of this major development, along with the substantial number
of recent United States and Washington Supreme Court decisions concern-
ing lawyers' ethics and professional responsibility. Many attorneys are
unaware of the significant differences between the now superseded Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR)2 and the RPC and the effect of recent
judicial decisions interpreting both the CPR and RPC. Consequently, a
review and analysis of the law of professional responsibility, including the
RPC and relevant case and statutory law, should prove helpful to Washing-
ton attorneys.
This Article contains two parts with different purposes. The first part
consists of an introduction and critique of the recently adopted Washington
Rules of Professional Conduct. Some of the rules that differ from the
Model Rules, that violate Constitutional requirements, or that inap-
propriately resolve competing policies are evaluated. Two of the most
important areas-confidentiality and advertising-are treated separately
and in-depth in student Survey Comments. 3 The second part of this Article
consists of an overview of the law of professional responsibility in Wash-
ington. It follows the organization and rule sequence of the RPC, with
annotations, applications, and interpretations from the ABA Model Rule
Comments4 and judicial decisions from Washington and elsewhere. This
1. See, e.g., infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
2. Effective January 1, 1972, to September 5, 1986.
3. See Survey Comment, Lawyer Advertising, 61 WASH. L. Rav. 903 (1986); Survey Comment,
Confidentiality Under the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct, 61 WASH. L. REv. 913 (1986)
[hereinafter cited as Survey Comment, Confidentiality].
4. The "Scope" section of the Model Rules provides:
The Comment accompanying each Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the
Rule. . . . The Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is
authoritative. Research notes were prepared to compare counterparts in the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. . . and to provide selected references to other authorities. The notes
have not been adopted, do not constitute part of the Model Rules, and are not intended to affect the
application or interpretation of the Rules and Comments.
As discussed infra note 10 and accompanying text, it is the author's belief that the Comments provide
useful, if not essential, elucidation, interpretation, and application of the individual rules. They will
undoubtedly be employed by Washington courts and the Washington State Bar Association as, at the
least, helpful legislative history and, possibly, as dispositive when on point. See infra text accompany-
ing note 10. Therefore, those portions of the Comments necessary to understand or apply the Rules are
cited or excerpted when appropriate.
Although the Comments have not been published in Washington, they may be found in Selected
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overview may be employed in understanding and applying the law of
professional responsibility as it presently exists. Citations to cases predat-
ing the effective date of the RPC have been included only when the law they
interpret is unchanged by the adoption of the RPC.
II. CRITIQUE OF THE RPC
A. Organization of the RPC
Even a cursory glance at the RPC reveals a striking departure from the
CPR: The Canons, 5 Ethical Considerations, 6 and Disciplinary Rules 7 have
been replaced with Rules. 8 The change is welcome because the effects and
applications of the Ethical Considerations under the CPR were never very
clear. Although by definition they were intended to be "aspirational," they
were treated variously by courts and bar disciplinary authorities as having
no weight in evaluating lawyers' conduct, as helpful in interpreting unclear
Disciplinary Rules, as legislative history with respect to the Disciplinary
Rules, and as binding, i.e., having the identical effect as Disciplinary
Rules. The result was lack of uniformity in application, confusion among
attorneys in attempting to determine their ethical obligations, and the
inappropriate use of many of the Ethical Considerations.
Statutes, Rules and Standards on the Legal Profession (West 1985), Selected Standards on Professional
Responsibility (Foundation Press 1986) (Morgan & Rotunda eds.), and any official ABA publication of
the Model Rules.
As stated in the "Scope" section of the Model Rules, the research Notes, unlike the Comments, were
not adopted and do not constitute part of the Model Rules. Therefore, they have not been included or
cited as such in the overview. However, when the legal authorities contained in the Notes accurately
reflect or explain the law of Professional Responsibility in Washington, they have been included as
annotations.
5. The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of
professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public, with the legal
system, and with the legal profession. They embody the general concepts from which the Ethical
Considerations and the Disciplinary Rules are derived.
CPR Preliminary Statement.
6. The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward
which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a body of principles upon
which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations.
Id.
7. The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in character. The
Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without
being subject to disciplinary action.
Id.
8. The Rules of Professional Conduct are mandatory in character. The rules state the minimum
level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action.
RPC Preliminary Statement.
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The RPC, on the other hand, contain only Rules. In the Scope section of
the Model Rules, a section unfortunately not included in the Washington
RPC, Rules are described as follows:
Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms "shall" or "shall not."
These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. Others,
generally cast in the term "may" are permissive and define areas under the
Rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion. No disciplinary action
should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds
of such discretion. Other Rules define the nature of relationships between the
lawyer and others. 9
Thus, for purposes of lawyer discipline and the establishment of a clear
minimum level of ethical lawyer conduct, the RPC constitute a substantial
improvement over the CPR. Those who suggest that the deletion of the
Ethical Considerations is undesirable because lawyers should aspire to a
level of practice far above the minimum should consider that there are
numerous sources for determining aspirational goals. An attorney who
desires to engage in the most ethical and responsible practice of law may
consult with colleagues, hornbooks and treatises, statements in judicial
opinions, ABA and state bar ethics opinions, the Ethical Considerations of
the CPR, and his or her own conscience. But at least the minimum
requirements of the profession will be both clear and uncontradictory.
B. Omission of ABA Model Rules Commentary
The Washington Supreme Court, in adopting the recommendations of
the State Bar Task Force, unfortunately neither adopted nor even published
the Comments to the Model Rules. Although the Rules state the minimum
level of ethical conduct, the intended interpretation and application of each
Rule is not always self-evident. The Comments provide that necessary
interpretation and application. The ABA and the states that have substan-
tially adopted the Model Rules have also adopted the Comments. To the
extent that the Washington courts and State Bar are aided by interpretation
and application of identical rules by courts in other jurisdictions, the
Comments will be used by those courts as legislative history and to resolve
ambiguities. In fact, on a number of occasions, the Washington courts have
relied on the legislative history and judicial interpretation of federal codes
in construing and applying identical provisions in Washington codes.' 0
9. Model Rules Scope section.
10. See, e.g., Harding v. Will, 81 Wn. 2d 132,500 P.2d 91(1972); In re Green, 14 Wn. App. 939,
546 P.2d 1230 (1976); Eberle v. Sutor, 3 Wn. App. 387, 389, 475 P.2d 564, 566 (1970) ("[w]here a
federal rule has been adopted as the state rule, the construction of the former should be applied to the
latter").
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Since the Comments will be relied upon in other jurisdictions, they will
inevitably be employed by Washington courts. They should be adopted by
the Washington Supreme Court as part of the CPR to avoid any ambiguity
or misunderstanding.
C. Greater Emphasis on Nonlitigation Conduct of Attorneys
One of the frequent criticisms of the CPR was that it was directed
primarily to attorneys as litigators. The RPC improve upon the CPR in
addressing the ethical responsibilities of lawyers in nonlitigational and
nonadversary proceedings." Likewise, the attorney's relationship with
clients and adversaries in pretrial preparation and during pretrial discovery
has been given expanded treatment in the RPC. 12 And several provisions of
the CPR that were only aspirational in nature (i.e., Ethical Considerations),
but are essential to the ethical practice of law, are now mandatory Rules. 13
D. Requirement of Written Fee and Consent Agreements
A significant improvement over the CPR is found in a number of Rules
requiring that understandings between attorney and client be reduced to
writing. Although such a writing requirement is in no way essential to the
ethical practice of law, a substantial amount of client dissatisfaction (man-
ifested in bar complaints and legal malpractice actions) and unnecessary
questioning of attorneys' conduct and motives has been caused by proceed-
ings to determine the precise nature of alleged agreements. Thus, the RPC
require that contingent fee agreements, 14 and client consent to the at-
torney's conflict of interest in certain situations, 15 must be in writing. In
addition to ensuring that the client fully understands the nature and im-
plications of these important agreements, the writing requirement will
resolve many of the disputes as to who agreed to what.
11. See, e.g., RPC Rules 2.1 (advisor); 2.2 (intermediary); 2.3 (evaluator); 5.1 and 5.2 (super-
visory and subordinate lawyers); 5.3 (responsibility for nonlawyer assistants); 6.4 (law reform activi-
ties).
12. See, e.g., RPC Rules 1.1-1.4; 3.2; 3.4. See also infra notes 39-67, 200, 218-37, and
accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., CPR EC 6-4 and RPC Rule 1.3 (diligence); CPR EC 7-8 and RPC Rule 1.4(a)
(communication with client); CPR EC 7-20 and RPC Rules 3.2 (expediting litigation), and 3.4(d)
(frivolous discovery requests and refusal to comply with "legally proper" discovery requests by
opponent).
14. RPC Rule 1.5(c). The Rule also requires that "[u]pon the conclusion ofa contingent fee matter,
the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there
is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination."
15. See RPC Rules 1.7(b)(2), 1.8(b), 1.8(h), 1.9(a), and 2.2(a).
Vol. 61:823, 1986
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In light of the benefits of the writing requirement, however, it is some-
what perplexing that, with respect to noncontingent fee agreements, the
RPC provide that the fee must be communicated to the client, "preferably
in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the
representation." 16 In addition, no explanation is provided for the omission
by the Washington Supreme Court of the writing requirement when a
lawyer obtains consent from the client for entering into a business relation-
ship or acquiring "an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary
interest adverse to a client."'1 7 Since Model Rule 1.8(a) requires client
consent to the potential or actual conflict of interest to be in writing, and the
RPC require written consent in the other conflict situations, it would seem
that a compelling reason would be necessary to justify the departure in the
area where disputes are most acrimonious and most damaging to the image
of lawyers and the legal profession. 18
E. Omission of Rules Regarding Corporate and Other Organizational
Clients
It is also unclear why the Rules Committee did not recommend and the
Washington Supreme Court did not adopt Model Rule 1.13, providing that a
"lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organiza-
tion acting through its duly authorized constituents," and prescribing
procedures whereby the attorney for an organization can determine the best
interests of the organization and prevent certain constituents from harming
the interests of the public or others in the organization. The RPC omit the
provision altogether, and incorporate no alternative to replace it. It is, in the
16. RPC Rule 1.5(b) (emphasis added). Since there are just as many disputes over the nature of the
fee agreement in noncontingent fee cases, and since the requirement of communicating the agreement
to the client is only "within a reasonable time after commencing the representation," there appears to
be no basis for not requiring a written fee agreement in all cases.
17. RPC Rule 1.8(a).
18. Despite the failure of RPC Rule 1.8 to require that client consent be in writing, attorneys in
Washington would be well advised to obtain written consent before engaging in business transactions
with their clients. See, e.g., Matter of McGlothlen, 99 Wn. 2d 515, 663 P.2d 1330 (1983). In
McGlothlen, the hearing officer and the Disciplinary Board disagreed as to whether the attorney's
disclosure to the client was sufficient. The court stated that "the burden upon the attorney defending his
or her actions is a great one," id. at 524, 663 P.2d at 1335, and quoted 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client
§ 127 (1980) as follows:
So strict is the rule on this subject that dealings between an attorney and his client are held, as
against the attorney, to be prima facie fraudulent, and to sustain a transaction of advantage to
himself with his client the attorney has the burden of showing not only that he used no undue
influence but that he gave his client all the information and advice which it would have been his
duty to give if he himself had not been interested, and that the transaction was as beneficial to the
client as it would have been had the client dealt with a stranger.
99 Wn. 2d at 525, 663 P.2d at 1335.
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author's opinion, essential that the RPC include some rule regarding the
duties of a lawyer for an organizational client. 19
F. Judicial Law Clerks
Under RPC Rule 1.12(b), ajudicial law clerk "may negotiate for employ-
ment with a party or attorney involved in a matter in which the clerk is
participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has
notified the judge. . . ... Ajudge, on the other hand, may not negotiate at
all for employment under those circumstances. 20 However, judicial deci-
sions regarding the ethical responsibilities of judicial law clerks have held
law clerks to the same standards regarding conflicts of interest as are
applicable to the judges for whom the law clerks work. Therefore, if the
judge would be required to disqualify him or herself due to a conflict, so
also must the law clerk. In fact, the law clerk's conflict could infect the
decision of the judge, despite the judge's claim that the law clerk had no
responsibility for the final decision. 21
A judge may avoid disqualification despite a conflict only if, following
disclosure, "the parties and lawyers, independently of the judge's par-
ticipation, all agree in writing that the judge's relationship is immaterial or
that his financial interest is insubstantial .... "22 Therefore, in order to
avoid the possibility of a subsequent challenge to an entire trial or appeal,
based on the law clerk's negotiations for employment with one of the
lawyers or firms involved in litigation in which the clerk "personally and
substantially" participates, the law clerk (or judge) should be required to
notify both parties and obtain consent.
G. Solicitation Rule May Be Unconstitutional As to Direct Mail
Advertising
Finally, with respect to specific rules, RPC Rule 7.3, to the extent that it
purports to define and prohibit direct mail advertising as solicitation, would
19. Even under the CPR, EC 5-18 provided some guidance to attorneys in Washington. The author
has received more requests to speak or consult on this issue, and there appears to be more confusion
concerning the ethical requirements, than with respect to any other ethical problem. If the reason for
omitting Model Rule 1.13 was based on disagreement with the policies inherent in the Rule, then it
should have been amended, rather than ignoring the subject altogether. For a general discussion of the
ethical responsibilities of corporate lawyers, see Riger, The ModelRules and Corporate Practice-New
Ethics for a Competitive Era, 17 CONN. L. REV. 729 (1985).
20. RPC Rule 1.12(b).
21. See, e.g., Hall v. Small Business Admin., 695 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983).
22. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (CJC) Canon 3(D).
830
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appear to be unconstitutional.2 3 Direct mail advertising appears to fit more
within the protection of advertising established by the Supreme Court in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,24 In re R.M.J., 25 and Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel,26 and is less susceptible to the abuses feared by the
Court with respect to in-person solicitation in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar.27
Because the use of direct mail advertising is not amenable to the abuses of
in-person solicitation, and has been held to be constitutionally protected by
the overwhelming majority of the courts that have faced the issue, the words
"by mail" and "by letter or other writing" should be deleted from the
definition of "solicit" in RPC Rule 7.3.28
H. Confidentiality vs. Protection of the Public and the Integrity of the
Courts
The rules that have been most controversial throughout the country and
which are the least justifiable as enacted in the RPC, are RPC Rules 1.6 and
3.3 dealing with the tension between the lawyer's duties of candor and
confidentiality. Under RPC Rule 1. 6(b)(1), there is an exception to the duty
of confidentiality with respect to information "the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary. . . [t]o prevent the client from committing a crime."
This is a departure from the ABA's Model Rule 1.6(b)(1);29 and most states
that have considered the Model Rules have rejected the ABA's version. 30
However, whereas RPC Rule 1.6 permits revelation of confidences and
secrets31 only to prevent the client from committing affuture crime, other
jurisdictions that have adopted or proposed adoption of the new rules have
also permitted (in some cases required 32) revelation necessary to prevent a
23. See, e.g., In re Madsen, 68 Ill.2d 472, 370 N.E.2d 199 (1977); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart,
568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978); Wollv. Kelley, 116 Mich. App. 191,323 N.W.2d560 (1982);InreAppert,
315 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981); Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432
N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981). For an in-depth analysis of this issue, see
Survey Comment, Lawyer Advertising, supra note 3.
24. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
25. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
26. 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
27. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
28. See Survey Comment, LawyerAdvertising, supra note 3 (discussing Zauderer and its applica-
tion to "targeted" and direct mail advertising).
29. See Survey Comment, Confidentiality, supra note 3.
30. See, e.g., Md. Rule 1.6; N.J. Rule 1.6; N.H. Rule 1.6; Wis. Rule 1.6. See also infra notes
31-34.
31. Unlike the Model Rules, the Washington RPC retained the distinction between confidences
("information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law"), and secrets ("other
information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client").
32. See, e.g., N.J. Rule 1.6 (mandatory disclosure of information necessary to prevent client from
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future fraud,33 and to rectify criminal or fraudulent acts in the furtherance
of which the lawyer's services had been used. 34
Under former CPR DR 7-102(B)(1), a lawyer in Washington who re-
ceived information clearly establishing that his client had,
in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or
tribunal, shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his
client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
tribunal and may reveal the fraud to the affected person. 35
Under RPC Rule 1.6(b)(1) as adopted, lawyers in Washington are not
permitted to reveal either the client's intent to defraud another or prior fraud
in furtherance of which the lawyer's services had been used, and are not
required to reveal even the client's intent to kill another person. At a time
when public respect for lawyers is at an all-time low and lawyers have been
increasingly found in complicity with their client's criminal or fraudulent
conduct, it is unfortunate that the Washington Supreme Court has gone on
record as lessening the duty of lawyers to protect the public from their
clients' criminal and fraudulent conduct. Although the reasons for vigilant
protection of client confidences are strong, 36 these policy bases disappear
when the client seeks, not representation with respect to past acts (whether
criminal or not), but rather to harm others in the future. Likewise, a client is
entitled to complete confidentiality with respect to proper legal representa-
tion, but has no justified expectation of confidentiality when he uses the
attorney to perpetrate a fraud on another person. It is a mistake for
Washington to prohibit revelation under those circumstances when it re-
quired revelation under the CPR.
Washington should clearly reaffirm its commitment to protect the public
and the integrity of lawyers in the legal system, consistent with its strong
concern for client confidentiality, by adopting a rule such as that recently
adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court: "A lawyer shall reveal such
confidences or secrets to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes neces-
sary . . .[t]o prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent
committing criminal, illegal, or fraudulent act which lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in
death or substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to financial or property interest, or to perpetrate a
fraud upon a tribunal); Ariz. Rule 1.6 (mandatory disclosure of information reasonably necessary to
prevent client from committing crime likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm; permissive
disclosure of client's intent to commit any crime and information necessary to prevent it); Conn. Rule
1.6 (same as Ariz.).
33. See, e.g., Md. Rule 1.6; N.J. Rule 1.6.
34. See, e.g., Conn. Rule 1.6; Wis. Rule 1.6.
35. Emphasis added.
36. See infra note 85 and accompanying text. The author is a strong supporter of attorney-client
confidentiality, and would permit few, if any, exceptions that would impair the legitimate representation
of a client's interests. See Aronson, ProfessionalResponsibility: Education and Enforcement, 51 WASH.
L. REV. 273 (1976).
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act," and in addition, "[a] lawyer may reveal such confidences or secrets to
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . [t]o rectify a
criminal or fraudulent act in the furtherance of which the lawyer's services
had been used." 37
Adoption of New Jersey Rule 1.6 would also make RPC Rule 3.3 more
reasonable. Under Model Rule 3.3(a)(2), a lawyer shall not knowingly
"[f]ail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary
to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client." Under Model
Rule 3.3(a)(4), "[i]f a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to
know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures."
And, under Model Rule 3.3(b), these duties of disclosure "apply even if
compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by rule
1.6."
RPC Rule 3.3, however, would only permit disclosure of materially false
statements to a tribunal if not prohibited under RPC Rule 1.6. Since RPC
Rule 1.6 only permits disclosure of the client's intent to commit a crime,
RPC Rules 1.6 and 3.3 permit far less candor to the court than the CPR38 or
Rules 1.6 and 3.3 as proposed or adopted in other states (and even less
candor than under the ABA's criticized Model Rules). Adoption of a Rule
1.6 like that of New Jersey's Rule 1.6 would eliminate the need to change
the language in Model Rule 3.3, since disclosure of a client's criminal or
fraudulent acts during the course of representation would not be prohibited
under New Jersey Rule 1.6. If RPC Rule 1.6 is not amended, then RPC Rule
3.3 should at least be amended to conform to Model Rule 3.3.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE RPC
TITLE I. CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP
Rule 1.1 Competence
The standard for competent representation 39 derived from legal malprac-
tice cases is "that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly
possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer in the
practice of law" in Washington.40 In order to determine if a lawyer has the
requisite legal knowledge and skill to represent a client, there are several
relevant factors that can be examined. These include the complexity and
specialized nature of the matter; the lawyer's general experience; the
37. N.L Rule 1.6
38. See CPR DR 7-102(B)(2). See also Survey Comment, Confidentiality, supra note 3.
39. RPC Rule 1.1.
40. Walker v. Bangs, 92 Wn. 2d 854, 859, 601 P.2d 1279, 1282 (1979) (quoting Cook, Flanagan &
Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wn. 2d 393, 395, 438 P.2d 865, 867 (1968)).
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lawyer's training and experience in the field; the amount of preparation and
study the lawyer is able to give the matter; and whether it is feasible (and if
the client consents) to refer the matter to, or associate with, a lawyer of
established competence in the field in question. 41
A lawyer does not necessarily need special training or prior experience
to handle a wholly novel field if she can gain the necessary level of
competence through reasonable preparation. 42 But the lawyer must possess
such fundamental legal skills as the ability to analyze precedent, evaluate
evidence, and draft legal documents. 43 In an emergency, a lawyer may give
advice or assistance although she does not have the requisite skill, if
referral, consultation, or association with another lawyer is impractical.
But the client's interests should never be jeopardized. 44
In order to ensure that lawyers keep current with recent developments in
the law, every Washington lawyer is required to complete at least fifteen
credit hours of approved continuing legal education a year.45
Rule 1.2 Scope of Representation
Both the lawyer and the client are responsible for determining the scope
of the representation that the lawyer will engage in on behalf of the client.
While the client has the ultimate authority to determine the scope of the
lawyer's representation, the lawyer is responsible for informing the client
of, and operating within, the limitations imposed by the RPC and applica-
ble laws. Within these limits, the client has the right to discuss with the
lawyer the means that will be employed to pursue a particular matter.46
However, this does not mean that the lawyer is required to pursue objectives
or means simply because it is the client's wish, particularly if the lawyer
finds the means or objectives repugnant to his beliefs.
A lawyer is to exercise his independent professional judgment at all
stages of his relationship with a client. However, the ultimate control of a
matter is in the hands of the client, who has broad authority as to the course
of action to be taken. The Rules state, with regard to objectives, that a
41. Model Rule 1.1 comment.
42. Thus, a lawyer acts competently if he exercises reasonable professional judgment, even though
his opinion on a difficult or unsettled question of law is erroneous. See, e.g., Hansen v. Wightman, 14
Wn. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975); Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 F. Supp. 1283 (M.D.
La. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1974). But cf. Procanik v. Cillo, 206 N.J. Super. 270,502 A.2d
94 (1985) (lawyer in specialized practice has duty to disclose clearly to clients his informed opinion that
settled law, which bars clients' claim, is ripe for reconsideration and to notify client of subsequent
change in settled law).
43. See supra note 42.
44. Id.
45. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE RULES (APR), Rule 11.2.
46. See Model Rule 1.2 comment.
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lawyer "shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
pursued."47 This indicates that the lawyer may not take independent action
on behalf of his client without at least consultation. Decisions that will
affect the merits of the case or substantially prejudice the client's rights
may only be made by the client. Typical examples of such decisions in civil
cases include the decision to accept a settlement offer48 or to waive an
affirmative defense; and, in criminal actions, the basic decision to plead to
a charge, waive jury trial, testify, or to appeal a conviction.49
Since the power to make the decision is the client's, she may, after being
informed of the various legal factors affecting her situation, make a deci-
sion to forego the legally available objectives or methods because of what
she considers to be overriding nonlegal factors, such as expenses to be
incurred, or concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. 50
Even where the decision is the client's, it is the lawyer's responsibility to
insure that the decision is an informed one. The lawyer should advise the
client of the possible effects of both the legal and nonlegal alternatives that
are available.
Those decisions which can be left to the lawyer are not spelled out in the
RPC. Generally they are recognized to encompass the procedural details of
litigation (often referred to as "tactics"), such as the choice of motions, the
scope of discovery, nonsubstantive stipulations, which witnesses to call,
and the nature of direct and cross-examination. 5 1 While the lawyer is bound
to respect the decision of the client, representation of a client "does not
constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or
moral views or activities."' 52 This disclaimer is necessary to ensure that
legal representation should not be denied to anybody, particularly those
who have unpopular beliefs. 53
47. RPC Rule 1.2(a) (emphasis added). In other jurisdictions, it has been held that (absent express
or implied permission) a lawyer cannot consent to extensions of time, waiver of forfeiture, or otherwise
alter the terms of a contract. E.g., Olfe v. Gordon, 93 Wis. 2d 173, 286 N.W.2d 573 (1980) (ignoring
client's instructions concerning such matters as obtaining a specific type of security for payment under a
contract of sale); Ashworth v. Hankins, 248 Ark. 567, 452 S.W.2d 838 (1970).
48. See supra note 47. In re Marriage of Ebbighausen, 42 Wn. App. 99, 708 P.2d 1220 (1985).
49. RPC Rule 1.2 and Model Rule 1.2 comment. See, e.g., United States v. Neff, 525 F.2d 361(8th
Cir. 1975); Hudson v. Alabama, 493 E2d 171 (5th Cir. 1974).
50. See Model Rule 1.2 comment.
51. See State v. Osborne, 102 Wn. 2d 87, 684 P.2d 683 (1984); State v. Adams, 91 Wn. 2d 86,586
P.2d 1168 (1978). "When one hires an attorney to represent him in litigation, that attorney has full
charge of the case as far as procedure and remedy are concerned. He is trained and skilled in the law. A
client has no knowledge of procedure and intrusts [sic] this to the attorney he employs." Shores Co. v.
Iowa Chem. Co., 268 N.W. 581,582 (Iowa 1936). Accord United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169 (9th
Cir. 1973).
52. RPC Rule 1.2(b) (emphasis added).
53. See Model Rule 1.2 comment; Olender, Symposium, The Right to Counsel and the "Unpopular
Cause"-Let Us Admit Impediments, 20 U. PrrT. L. Rnv. 749 (1959).
Washington Law Review Vol. 61:823, 1986
The objectives or scope of services provided by a lawyer may be limited
by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer's
services are made available to the client. 54 A public defender, for example,
may only be allowed to handle criminal matters and not civil. A retainer
between a private attorney and client may be for a specific purpose. 55 The
limitations may also exclude objectives or means that may be repugnant or
imprudent.
A lawyer is required to give the client an honest opinion about the
possible consequences of the client's actions. But the lawyer may not give
advice to take actions which she knows 56 are criminal or fraudulent. 57
When a client has already taken a course of action that is illegal, a lawyer
may not give advice which may further that course of action (for example,
advice on how to conceal tax fraud). To this end, if the lawyer were helping
a client and then found out that the transaction was illegal, the lawyer would
be required to stop giving assistance. A lawyer may not knowingly partici-
pate in a sham transaction or a transaction to defraud anyone. 58 A lawyer
may, however, "counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law." 59 A
lawyer may have a duty to a beneficiary when the client is a fiduciary.60
54. See RPC Rule 1.2(c).
55. See Model Rule 1.2 comment.
56. As stated in the Terminology section of the RPC, "knowingly," "known," or "knows"
"denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the
circumstances."
57. RPC Rule 1.2(d). See also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 84 (1932).
58. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Beaver, 248 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1971) (attempt to misrepresent client's
financial condition in a pending divorce).
59. See supra note 57. Justice Holmes, in Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395-96
(1930), stated:
The fact that [the client] desired to evade the law, as it is called, is immaterial, because the very
meaning of a line in the law is that you intentionally may go as close to it as you can if you do not
pass it . . . . It is a matter of proximity and degree as to which minds will differ ....
The approach whereby the attorney advises a client as to the dictates of the law and the ramifications of
various alternative courses of action, leaving it to the client to decide which course to take, is often
referred to as the "Anatomy of a Murder Approach," from TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958).
The attorney may assume, in the absence of "knowledge" to the contrary, that the client, informed of the
bounds of the law, will choose to stay within those bounds, rather than use the information to break the
law. However, attorney conduct that substantially contributes to the accomplishment of the client's
criminal or fraudulent purpose is clearly improper. See, e.g., In re Blatt, 65 N.J. 539, 324 A.2d 15
(1974) (drafting documents necessary to achieve client's purpose); In re La Duca, 62 N.J. 133,299 A.2d
405 (1973) (negotiating on behalf of the client); In re Feltman, 51 N.J. 27, 237 A.2d 473 (1968)
(supplying a form to be used in the client's scheme).
60. Model Rule 1.2 comment.
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Rule 1.3 Diligence
A lawyer should take the necessary steps to accomplish the objective of a
matter in a timely fashion so as not to prejudice the client's interests (for
example, by filing a late appeal or overlooking the statute of limitations).61
A lawyer should also maintain a manageable case load in order to leave
enough time so that all clients can be effectively represented. Further,
unless the lawyer notifies the client as to the termination of the relationship,
the lawyer should complete all matters undertaken. 62
Rule 1.4 Communication
A lawyer must keep the client reasonably informed of any actions the
lawyer is taking. 63 The lawyer must inform the client of communications or
negotiations with other parties so that the client may make an informed
decision as to serious offers. 64 The lawyer must also inform the client of any
settlement or plea bargain offers made by an opposing party. Even if the
offer is not satisfactory in the lawyer's view, the client must be informed of
the offer and then be apprised of the lawyer's opinion, since the ultimate
decision rests with the client. 65 The client may, however, give the lawyer
prior permission to reject an offer if the offer would be unacceptable to the
client. There may be some circumstances in which a lawyer may be justified
in delaying transmission of information where, for example, immediate
communication would cause the client to act imprudently, 66 or where, due
61. See, e.g., Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wn. 2d 254,704 P.2d 600 (1985); People v. King, 191 Colo.
120, 550 P.2d 848 (1976); In re Parise, 53 A.D.2d 272, 385 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1976).
62. See Spindell v. State Bar, 13 Cal. 3d 253, 530 P.2d 168, 118 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1975).
63. As stated by one legal commentator.
The lawyer must communicate to the client, in language the client understands, what the
various available courses of action are and why the particular course of action was chosen over the
others, before the action is taken. . . . Over half of the complaints received by the Committee on
Professional Ethics and Conduct. . . are filed because the lawyer failed toproperly communicate
with the client.
Gaudineer, Ethics and Malpractice, 26 DRAKE L. RaV. 88, 115 (1976). Thus, courts have imposed
discipline for failure to advise clients as to the status of their affairs, e.g., State v. Martindale, 215 Kan.
667,527 P.2d 703 (1974), or to respond to a client's request for information, see e.g., People v. James,
180 Colo. 133, 502 P.2d 1105 (1972); In re Miller, 54 A.D.2d 69,387 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1976). In addition,
if the attorney advises a course of action that may result in adverse consequences to the client, she must
also advise the client of the risks, as well as the available alternatives and their consequences. See, e.g.,
Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 F Supp. 1283 (M.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1131 (5th
Cir. 1974).
64. See RPC Rule 1.4(b).
65. See, e.g., Fowler v. American Fed. of Tobacco Growers, 195 Va. 770, 80 S.E.2d 554 (1954)
(possibility that agreement would create a more extensive obligation than the client desired to assume).
66. See Model Rule 1.4 comment ("Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a
client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may
not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience.")
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to mental illness, the client cannot make a rational decision. 67
The lawyer is not expected to explain or relay communications to every
member of a client organization or group, but should keep representatives
of the organization or group informed. 68
Rule 1.5 Fees
The fee arrangement for representation of a client is a matter left for the
individual attorney and client. There are, however, certain principles gov-
erning the setting of fees and the form of compensation. Since many clients
have little or no experience in dealing with attorneys and their fee struc-
tures, a lawyer has a duty to explain fully to his clients the reasons for the
particular fee arrangement that he proposes, especially when the lawyer
has not represented the client before. 69 It is also advisable, in order to
prevent subsequent misunderstandings, that the lawyer and his client reach
an agreement as to the basis of the fee charges as early as possible in the
professional relationship. Such an agreement should, in most instances, be
reduced to writing.70
A contingent fee is a fee that is dependent on the outcome of a client's
case and is payable from the judgment proceeds. 71 Usually, such fees take
the form of a set percentage of the recovery, the fee being zero if there is no
recovery. 72 In certain specific instances contingent fees are prohibited. 73 A
67. See RPC Rule 1.13 and Model Rule 1.14 comment. (Because Washington did not adopt Model
Rule 1.13, RPC Rules 1.13, 1.14, and 1.15 correspond to Model Rules 1.14, 1.15, and 1.16.)
68. Model Rule 1.4 comment.
69. See RPC Rule 1.5(b).
70. Id.
It is not necessary to recite all the factors that underlie the basis of the fee, but only those that are
directly involved in its computation. It is sufficient, for example, to state that the basic rate is an
hourly charge or a fixed amount or an estimated amount, or to identify the factors that may be taken
into account in finally fixing the fee.
Model Rule 1.5 comment.
71. See R. ARONSON, ATTORNEY-CLiENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS: REGULATION AND REVIEW 74 (1980).
For a survey of legislation and judicial decisions concerning contingent fee arrangements, see id. at
74-118.
72. See also Ross v. Scannell, 97 Wn. 2d 598,608-09,647 P.2d 1004, 1010 (1982) (quoting Ramey
v. Graves, 112 Wash. 88, 91, 191 P. 801 (1920)):
The rule is that, where the compensation of an attorney is to be paid to him contingently on the
successful prosecution of a suit and he is discharged or prevented from performing the service, the
measure of damages is not the contingent fee agreed upon, but reasonable compensation for the
services actually rendered.
73. In addition, "[wihen there is doubt whether a contingent fee is consistent with the client's best
interest, the lawyer should offer the client alternative bases for the fee and explain their implications."
Model Rule 1.5 comment. Likewise, a contingent fee agreement may be unreasonable if employed in a
simple case presenting no real difficulty. See, e.g., Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1973),
rev'd sub noma. Pete v. UMW Welfare & Retire. Fund, 517 F.2d 1275 (D.C. 1975); Anderson v.
Kennelly, 37 Colo. App. 217, 547 P.2d 260 (1975).
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contingent fee is prohibited in a domestic relations matter where the fee
would be "contingent upon the securing of a dissolution or annulment of
marriage or upon the amount of maintenance or support, or property
settlement in lieu thereof (except in postdissolution proceedings)." 74 Con-
tingent fees are flatly prohibited in criminal cases.
When contingent fees are permissible, the attorney must reduce the
agreement to writing and state the method by which the fee is to be
determined, including the percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the
event of settlement, trial, or appeal, 75 and litigation or other expenses to be
deducted, including whether they are to be deducted before or after the
contingent fee is calculated. 76 Following resolution of the matter, the
attorney must furnish the client with a written statement, including the
outcome of the matter, whether there was a recovery, and if there was a
recovery, the remittance due the client and its method of determination. 77
A lawyer's fee for services must be reasonable. 78 A reasonable fee is
defined as a fee that an attorney of ordinary prudence would charge in a like
situation (an objective standard).79 The factors to be considered in deter-
mining reasonableness include:
a. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
b. The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
c. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal ser-
vices;
d. The amount involved and the results obtained;
e. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
f. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client;
74. RPC Rule 1.5(d)(1). See also In re Smith, 42 Wn. 2d 188, 254 P.2d 464 (1953).
75. RPC Rule 1.5(c).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. RPC Rule 1.5(a). In civil litigation, the lawyer carries the burden of demonstrating the amount
of the fee and its reasonableness. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Clausing, 74 Wn. 2d 483, 445 P.2d 637 (1968).
79. What constitutes a reasonable fee can vary from case to case. See generally R. ArONSON, supra
note 71, at 28-56. Although comparison with fees of other attorneys in the area is permissible, in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court declared that the imposition of a
minimum fee schedule by state bar associations was a violation of the federal antitrust laws. See also
infra note 339 and accompanying text.
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g. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
h. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 80
A division offee is "a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or
more lawyers who are not in the same firm."81 The division of fees allows
an attorney to associate with another attorney or attorneys in cases where
the sole attorney could not serve his client as well without some outside
help. In Washington, a division of fees may only be made if: (a) "[t]he
division is between the lawyer and a duly authorized lawyer referral service
of either the Washington State Bar Association or of one of the county bar
associations of this state;" or (b) "[t]he division is in proportion to the
services provided by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client,
each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; the client is
advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers
involved; and the total fee is reasonable." 82
Rule 1.6 Confidentiality
An attorney has a specific obligation to preserve the confidences and
secrets of a client. This has long been considered one of the most important
responsibilities owed the client. Confidences refers to information received
by the attorney which is protected by the evidentiary attorney-client priv-
ilege. 83 Generally, the attorney-client privilege will be said to apply to
80. RPC Rule 1.5(a)(1)-(8).
81. Model Rule 1.5 comment.
82. RPC Rule 1.5(e). In McNeary v. American Cyanamid Co., 105 Wn. 2d 136, 712 P.2d 845
(1986), the Washington Supreme Court, interpreting former CPR DR 2-107, held:
We believe the disciplinary rule indicates that division of fees by attorneys jointly participating
in handling a case must take into account proportionate shares of services. . . .To let an attorney
refer a case to another, perform some initial services, and then receive half the fee allows the
avoidance of the rule and our holding in Belli [v. Shaw, 29 Wn. App. 875, 631 P.2d 980 (1981),
aff'd, 98 Wn. 2d 569, 657 P.2d 315 (1983)].
On the other hand, CPR DR 2-107 should not mean that attorneys must "correlate each minute
spent on a case to each penny earned therefrom in order to achieve proportionality between 'the
responsibility assumed and services performed' on the one hand and each attorney's share of the
fee on the other." Fitzgibbon v. Carey, 70 Or. App. 127, 137,688 P.2d 1367 (1984), review denied,
298 Or. 553, 695 P.2d 49 (1985).
McNeary, 105 Wn. 2d at 142, 712 P.2d at 848. On its face, RPC Rule 1.5(e)(2) would appear to permit
referral fees under the limitations noted. However, a referral fee to an attorney who has performed no
legal services should be paid with extreme caution. Although the court in McNeary recognized that
RPC Rule 1.5(e)(2) is a "different provision" from DR 2-107, seeMcNeary at 139 n.4, 712 P.2d at 847
n.4, it did not temper its strong disapproval of referral fees. In addition, RPC Rule 7.2(c) provides that
an attorney may not "give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's services
. ... Unless another lawyer is not considered "a person," then pure referral fees are impermissible
under RPC Rule 7.2(c), even if not barred by RPC Rule 1.5(e)(2).
83. RPC Rule 1.6(a).
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confidential communications made by an individual to an attorney unless
the client has consented to disclosure after consultation, "except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the represen-
tation" or as stated in RPC Rule 1.6(b). 84 The purpose of the rule is to
promote full disclosure between the client and the lawyer so that the lawyer
can most capably represent the client. 85
All of the evidentiary exceptions to the attorney-client privilege apply to
the definition of confidences as well. Thus, suppose client A is sought by
the police as a suspect in certain criminal activity, andA contacts attorney X
and tells him of his whereabouts for the purpose of securing legal advice
from X. Under such circumstances, X may not reveal A's whereabouts.
However, X may not actively assist A in avoiding the authorities. Further-
more, if A has jumped bail, X is under an obligation to inform the court of
A's whereabouts. 86
Another situation requiring close analysis under the attorney-client
privilege is indicated by In re Armani,87 and People v. Belge,8 8 where a
client employed two attorneys to represent him in a murder trial. During
their discussion, the client admitted to the murder and also revealed two
other unrelated murders, giving complete details as to where the bodies of
the victims could be found. The attorneys withheld all information con-
cerning the two murders from both the authorities and the parents of the
victims. Both the disciplinary committee and the courts that reviewed the
attorneys' conduct held that the attorneys had acted properly within the
scope of the attorney-client privilege.89
The attorney-client privilege is limited to communications as opposed to
the underlying facts. Therefore, parties may be interviewed about facts
observed by them, but not any communications about those facts revealed
to counsel. 90 The attorney-client privilege is also limited to communica-
tions between the attorney and client. If the substance of the communica-
tion is revealed to another who is not a party to the privileged relationship,
the privilege is destroyed. 91 However, the obligation to preserve the client's
84. Id.
85. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,389 (1981); Heidebrink v. Moriwaki, 104 Wn. 2d
392, 706 P.2d 212 (1985); State v. Chervenell, 99 Wn. 2d 309, 316, 662 P.2d 836, 840 (1983). See
generally R. ARONSON, THE LAw OF EVIDENCE IN WASHINGTON V-3 to V-5 (1986).
86. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 155 (1936).
87. 83 Misc. 2d 252, 371 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1975).
88. 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1975), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867, 359
N.E.2d 377 (1976).
89. Id. See also N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 479 (1978).
90. See Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 103 Wn. 2d 192, 195, 691 P.2d 564, 566 (1984) (citing
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)).
91. R. ARoNsoN, supra note 85, V-2 to V-7. See also State v. Vandenberg, 19 Wn. App. 182, 575
P.2d 254 (1978) (once attorney's version of facts is made known to jury for impeachment, con-
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confidences also extends to such essential third persons as clerks and
secretaries, who are necessary to enable the lawyer to perform her duties
properly. Therefore, revelation to such intermediaries, for the purpose of
facilitating the representation, does not destroy the privilege. 92 Where the
client is a corporation or other organizational entity, the privilege applies
only to (1) communications, (2) made by the organization's employees and
(3) concerning matters within the scope of their duties, (4) to its counsel
acting as such, (5) at the direction of organizational superiors, (6) in order
to secure legal advice. 93
Secrets encompass "other information that the attorney has received
pursuant to the relationship with the client that the client has requested to be
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would
be likely to be detrimental to the client."' 94 The professional duty to
preserve all secrets is broader than the attorney-client privilege in several
ways. The obligation applies in every situation and not just in judicial
proceedings. 95 A lawyer must not reveal any confidence or secret gained in
the professional relationship. This is true even if the information was gained
before or after the relationship existed. And the client is not required to
indicate to the attorney that the information is a secret or should be held in
confidence. Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the ethical duty to main-
tain confidences and secrets applies to information communicated by the
client in the presence of other persons. Thus, for example, suppose that
attorney X is representing A in negotiations with Y. Any information that X
learns during these negotiations, such as trade secrets, is not covered by the
attorney-client privilege due to the presence of Y. Such information does
fall, however, within X's obligation to preserve his client's secrets.
The duty of nondisclosure covers the period prior and subsequent to the
creation of the attorney-client relationship, as well as during the relation-
ship. Further, a lawyer must protect confidential information even if no
attorney-client relationship is established. 96 The theory behind this rule is
that an attorney cannot make an evaluation of a potential client's case unless
the client is completely candid, and a potential client will not be completely
candid unless his conversations with the attorney are considered con-
fidential, whether or not the attorney eventually takes the case. 97 Similarly,
fidentiality destroyed).
92. See R. ARONSON, supra note 85, V-2. See also City & County of San Francisco v. Superior
Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951).
93. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
94. Id.
95. See Model Rule 1.6 comment. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1957).
96. See Heidebrink v. Moriwaki, 104 Wn. 2d 392, 706 P.2d 212 (1985).
97. See Model Rule 1.6 comment.
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after employment terminates, the lawyer must continue to protect all
confidences and secrets learned during the course of the relationship. 98
Not only must the attorney protect against the disclosure of confidential
information by himself, but must also ensure that others do not disclose the
information for their own purposes. At all times, the lawyer must take care
to prevent employees and fellow firm members from disclosing or utilizing
confidential information obtained from a client.99 On the other hand, it is
not improper for a lawyer to give limited, necessary information to an
outside agency for such purposes as bookkeeping, provided she warns the
agency that the information must be kept confidential.100 Failure to use
reasonable care in keeping these outsiders from disclosing confidential
information is a violation of the RPC.
Any information acquired in the course of representing a client may not
be used to the disadvantage of the client, or even by the lawyer for the
lawyer's own purposes, absent informed consent by the client. For exam-
ple, suppose that a client is an inventor and an officer in a major corpora-
tion. He has a consultation with his attorney concerning some personal
affairs and an important invention that he has just developed for the
corporation. Although the lawyer realizes the importance of the invention
to the corporation, she may not deal in the corporation's stock without the
informed consent of the client. She is, of course, also subject to the insider
trading provisions of the Securities Acts.
Exceptions
A lawyer may reveal confidences or secrets in five limited instances: first,
where the client has consented to disclosure after being fully informed as to
the consequences of consent, or second, where the confidence or secret is
required to be disclosed by law or court order. Third, the attorney may
reveal communications concerning the intention of the client to commit a
future crime. 10 1 This exception allows disclosure by the attorney of all
98. Id.
99. See RPC Rule 5.3. However, "[Il]awyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice,
disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that
particular information be confined to specified lawyers." Model Rule 1.6 comment.
100. See, e.g., RuLEs FOR LAWYER DiscnitiaN (RLD), Rule 13.1, authorizing the State Bar
Disciplinary Board to examine the books and records of any lawyer or firm of lawyers, selected at
random, or on the basis of complaints or suspected violation of RPC Rule 1. 14 ("Preserving Identity of
Funds and Property of a Client"). However, any such examinations "shall extend only to the books and
records of such lawyer or firm of lawyers." RLD 13.1(a).
101. RPC Rule 1.6(b)(1). In such a case, the client has not sought advice from a lawyer acting in his
professional capacity.
In order that the [privilege] may apply there must be both professional confidence and professional
Washington Law Review Vol. 61:823, 1986
information necessary to prevent the crime. 102 In addition, confidentiality
is destroyed if the attorney gives advice to the client, under circumstances
whereby a reasonable person would know that the advice is criminal, in
order to commit a crime or fraud, and the client acts on that advice. 103 It is
important to note that the basic duty of nondisclosure continues to apply to
all confidential communications which reveal that the client has already
committed a crime or other unlawful act. 104 The scope of the exception is
less clear when the incriminating evidence is not communicated but pre-
sented to the attorney. Those courts which have addressed the issue have
held that an attorney may not take or retain possession of the "fruits or
instrumentalities" of a crime. 105
employment, but if the client has a criminal object in view . . .one of these elements must
necessarily be absent. The client must either conspire with his [counsel] or deceive him. If his
criminal object is avowed, the client does not consult his adviser professionally, because it cannot
be the [lawyer's] business to further any criminal object. If the client does not avow his object, he
reposes no confidence.
State v. Phelps, 545 P.2d 901,904 (Or. App. 1976) (quoting Queen v. Cox, [1884] 14 Q.B. 153, 168). In
addition, unlike past criminal acts, which the lawyer cannot prevent, revelation of the client's intent to
commit a future crime can serve to protect innocent third persons.
102. The Rule provides for revelation of only such confidential information as the lawyer "reason-
ably believes necessary" to prevent the crime. Further, it should be noted that the Rule is permissive
only; failure to disclose is not a violation of the Rule:
The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of such factors as the nature of the
lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's
own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. Where
practical, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable action. In any case, a
disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to the purpose.
Model Rule 1.6 comment. Whereas the ethicalprovision is only permissive, however, it is possible that
the attorney could be compelled to reveal the information in a judicial proceeding under the "future
crime or fraud" exception to the attorney-client privilege. See generally R. ARONSON, supra note 85,
V-8 to V-9. Likewise, the attorney's failure to disclose might also subject him to tort liability for failure
to warn a known intended victim. Compare Tarasoff v. Regents, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976) (since ethical standards of psychiatric profession permitted disclosure under the
circumstances, failure to warn foreseeable victim of a known danger presented by his patient breached
psychiatrist's common law duty to warn or disclose), and Dike v. Dike, 75 Wn. 2d 1, 448 P.2d 490
(1968) (attorneys must, upon learning that a client plans an assault or other violent crime, warn
foreseeable victims), with Hawkins v. King County, 24 Wn. App. 338, 602 P.2d 361 (1979) ("[T]he
obligation to warn, when confidentiality would be compromised to the client's detriment, must be
permissible at most, unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the client has formed a firm
intention to inflict serious personal injuries on an unknowing third person.").
103. See UNiF. R. EVD. 502(d)(1), 13 U.L.A. 250 (1980) (confidentialty destroyed if advice was
obtained to "commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud");
Glade v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 738, 143 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1978); Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim.
187, 261 S.W.2d 339 (advice to "ditch" the murder weapon), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855 (1953) .
104. See generally Model Rule 1.6 comment.
105. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wn. 2d 828, 833-35, 394 P.2d 681, 684-85
(1964) (prosecutor's subpoena duces tecum demanding production by attorney of knife obtained from
client unenforceable; however, attorney had duty, "as an officerof the court," to turn over such criminal
evidence "after a reasonable period" to the prosecution, to avoid becoming a "repository for the
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Disclosure of confidences or secrets may also be permitted in two
additional circumstances: where disclosure is necessary (1) to establish or
collect a fee, or (2) to defend the lawyer or his employees or associates
against accusations of wrongful conduct. 106 The accusations may take one
of several forms. First, the client may sue the attorney for malpractice or
breach of contract. Second, the client may file a complaint with the local
grievance committee. Third, the attorney's conduct in the representation
may form the basis of a criminal charge or civil claim by third parties. In
such cases, confidences or secrets may be revealed if they are relevant to the
proceedings. In one case, an attorney, who had worked on the registration
of securities for his firm's client, and had disagreed with his superiors over
their nondisclosure of certain facts in the registration statement, resigned
from the firm. He then filed an affidavit With the SEC, detailing his efforts
to convince his firm to rectify the nondisclosure and reporting their con-
templated nondisclosure in another securities registration. Subsequently,
the attorney was named, along with the law firm and the client, as a
defendant in a stockholder's suit for violations of the securities law and for
negligence, fraud, and deceit. In exchange for having his name dropped as a
defendant, he presented a copy of his earlier affidavit to the plaintiff's
attorneys. The court held that the attorney had not breached his duty of
confidentiality, since he "had a right to make an appropriate disclosure
with respect to his role in the public offering," and since information
obtained from the client was incidental, rather than central, to the dis-
closure he made. 07
The RPC have eliminated the CPR exception to the nondisclosure duty
where the client engages in fraud during the representation. Former CPR
DR 7-102(B)(1) required revelation to the affected tribunal and permitted
revelation to the affected person of the client's perpetration of a fraud
suppression of criminal evidence"); Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Ryder,
263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967), aff'd, 381 F.2d 713 (1967); Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200 (Alaska
1978). In addition, although an attorney has no duty to reveal the whereabouts of the proceeds or
evidence of his client's criminal conduct, and may even take pictures to preserve the evidence, see In re
Armani, 83 Misc. 2d 252, 371 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1975); People v. Beige, 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d
771 (1975), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867, 359 N.E.2d 377 (1976), the evidence must be
turned over to the prosecution if it is moved or altered in any way to avoid responsibility for the
destruction of evidence. See, e.g., People v. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d 682, 631 P.2d 46, 175 Cal. Rptr. 612
(1981). See generally Note, Legal Ethics and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665 (1979).
106. RPC Rule 1.6(b)(2).
107. Meyerhofferv. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F2d 1190,1194-95 (2d Cir.) (relying on
former CPR DR 4-101(B), permitting a lawyer to reveal confidences and secrets necessary to defend
himself against "an accusation of wrongful conduct"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974). A numberof
commentators have argued that the exception, now arguably part of RPC Rule 1.6(b)(2), should be
limited to self-defense disclosures in response to accusations by the client, on a waiver theory. See
generally Levine, Self-Interest or Self-Defense: Lawyer Disregard of the Attorney-Client Privilege for
Profit and Protection, 5 Hot'sTA L. REv. 783 (1977).
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during the course of the representation. There is no such requirement (or
even permission) in the RPC. 108 However, under RPC Rule 1. 15(b)(1), the
lawyer may withdraw if the client "persists in a course of action involving
the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or
fraudulent. " 109
Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest
A lawyer must be very careful not to enter into a relationship where there
is a potential conflict of interest that is likely to affect adversely his ability
to exercise independent and professional judgment."l0 Where an imper-
missible conflict is found to exist, the lawyer may be subject to disqualifica-
tion, loss of fees, and civil liability for malpractice, even if formal disciplin-
ary action is not undertaken."'
A lawyer may not represent two clients whose interests are directly
adverse to one another except under the narrow circumstances noted
below. 112 The reasons for this rule should be obvious. Since the lawyer has
a duty to represent each client so that the client's interests are protected, if
the lawyer were to represent clients who were adverse to each other, one
client's interests necessarily would suffer. If an impermissible conflict of
interest exists before representation is undertaken, representation should be
declined. 113
An impermissible conflict may exist if there is substantial discrepancy in
the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an oppos-
ing party, or substantially different possibilities of settlement of claims or
liabilities in question. 114 Dual representation of clients with adverse inter-
ests is permitted only if "[t]he lawyer reasonably believes the representa-
tion will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
[e]ach client consents in writing after consultation and a full disclosure of
the material facts (following authorization from the other client to make
such a disclosure)."115 If the clients' interests are truly adverse, however,
108. For a criticism of this deletion, see supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
109. RPC Rule 1.15(b)(2). See generally Model Rule 1.6 comment.
110. "A lawyer's loyalty . . . may be diluted by a limitless number of personal interests-
financial security, prestige, and self-esteem-and interests of third persons-family, friends, business
associates, employer, legal profession, and society as a whole." Aronson, Conflict ofInterest Problems
of the Private Practioner, in ABA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A GUIDE FOR ATrORNEYS 91, 93
(Ream ed. 1978).
111. See Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REv. 807, 810 (1977), and authorities cited
therein.
112. RPC Rule 1.7(a).
113. See Model Rule 1.7 comment. See also RPC Rule 1. 15(a)(1).
114. See generally Aronson, supra note 111, at 821-32.
115. RPC Rule 1.7(a)(1)-(2). It has been held that, absent consent, a lawyer may not undertake
representation adverse to a current client even in an entirely unrelated matter. See, e.g., IBM Corp. v.
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rarely will an attorney's belief that she can adequately represent both be
"reasonable". One test for identifying an impermissible conflict is that
when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree
to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot
properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of
the client's consent. 116
If there is just the possibility that a conflict of interest may arise, such that
the representation of one client "may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own
interests, ' 117 the critical questions concern the likelihood that a conflict
will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the
lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or
will foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf
of the client. 118 Therefore, the attorney should explain the implications of
the common representation, including the advantages and risks involved,
and suggest that the client obtain the advice of independent counsel. 119
If an actual conflict does arise between the interests of the various
clients, an attorney is subject to discipline if she fails to withdraw from the
case. If, for example, Husband and Wife are seeking a dissolution and wish
to have Attorney handle the matter and if, after Attorney fully explains to
each of them the various conflicts that could arise, they both wish her to
continue and notify her of this fact in writing, then Attorney may do so if
she reasonably believes that she can undertake the representation without
adversely affecting either's interests. If it later appears that a property
Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir..1978); Chateau de Ville Prods. v. Tams-Whitmark Music Library, 474 F.
Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
116. Model Rule 1.7 comment.
117. RPC Rule 1.7(b).
118. See id.; Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 448 F.2d 1175, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per
curiam) ("Whether facts are discovered and legal positions taken which would create such a conflict of
interest. . . may well be determined by the approach which counsel. . . takes in this case. We think
that the objectives. . .would be much better served by having an unquestionably independent new
counsel. ... ), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
119. See Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn. 2d 581, 588-89, 675 P.2d 193, 199
(1983). This requirement has been referred to as a requirement of "full disclosure." One court has stated
that "full disclosure" implies communicating "all of the facts and implications" of an attorney's
representation of multiple clients and any circumstances which might cause a client to question the
undivided loyalty of the lawyer. City Council v. Sakai, 58 Hawaii 390, 570 P.2d 565,574 (1977). It has
also been held that such disclosure includes a clear explanation of the risks and disadvantages to the
client and an explanation of the advantages of seeking independent legal advice. In re James, 452 A.2d
163 (D.C. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1038 (1983);In re Boivin, 271 Or. 419,533 P.2d 171 (1975). It
has generally been accepted that the requirement of full disclosure is not satisfied by merely informing
the client of the fact of multiple representation. See, e.g., Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646
F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981).
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settlement cannot be reached, Attorney should withdraw from the case and
advise both Husband and Wife to seek separate attorneys.
A lawyer, or any partner, associate, or lawyer affiliated with the lawyer in
question, should avoid accepting or continuing a relationship with a client
where the interests of the client may conflict with (or simply be divergent
from) the interests of another client and such differences will or are likely to
affect the lawyer's ability to exercise independent professional judgment.
In this connection, all doubts are to be resolved against the propriety of the
representation. 120
If a third party is paying for the representation of a client, the lawyer must
make certain that the client consents after consultation, that there is no
interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, and
that the confidences and secrets of the client are protected. 121 Suppose that
X is the attorney for an insurance company. A is one of the company's
insureds and has just had an automobile accident. Under A's insurance
contract, the insurance company has an obligation to provide A with a
defense if an action is brought against him. At the same time, the insurance
company seeks to deny A's claim on the basis of an exclusion in the
insurance policy. X may represent either the insurance company or A, but
not both. X may represent A if X reasonably believes that the representation
of A will not be adversely affected by his relationship with the insurance
company. X may not reveal any of A's confidences to the insurance
company. The insurance company must hire outside counsel for the case
that X does not take. 122
Rule 1.8 Conflict of Interest; Prohibited Transactions; Current Client
When representing a client, a lawyer is prohibited from participating in
certain transactions. The reasons for the prohibition are: first, by participat-
ing in these transactions, the lawyer may be faced with a conflict of interest;
and second, even if there is no actual conflict of interest, participation in the
transactions may appear to be improper conduct on the part of the lawyer.
A lawyer may not enter into a business transaction with a client or
knowingly acquire ownership, possessory, security, or pecuniary interests
adverse to a client, unless: (1) the transaction is fair and reasonable; (2) the
client is informed in writing of the terms of the agreement in a manner that
the client can understand; (3) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to
120. See Model Rule 1.7 comment. Thus, "[i]t has been suggested that a good rule of thumb is
'When in doubt, don't."' Wash. State Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. No. 161, reprinted in 29
WASH. STATE BAR NEws 47 (Oct. 1975).
121. RPC Rule 1.8(0.
122. See generally Aronson, supra note 111, at 822-25.
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seek the advice of independent counsel; (4) and the client consents. 123 A
lawyer may not use information gained in the representation of a client to
the client's disadvantage unless the client consents in writing after consul-
tation.124 If the lawyer is related to opposing counsel in a matter, the client
must be informed of this relationship and must consent after consulta-
tion. 125 Nor may the lawyer prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or the
lawyer's relatives any substantial gift. This includes gifts by will or other
methods. 126 An exception is made when the lawyer is related to the
donee.127
A lawyer may not, prior to the conclusion of the representation, "make
or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a
portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the
representation. "128
123. RPC Rule 1.8(a).
124. RPC Rule 1.8(b). See Carson v. Fogg, 34 Wash. 448, 76 P. 112 (1904). The attorney might also
be subject to civil liability under other law for use of any information gained in the course of
representation. See, e.g., SEC v. Hall, FE. SEc. L. RPmR. (CCH) § 97,292 (D.D.C. 1980).
125. RPC Rule 1.8(i). "Rule 1.8(i) applies to related lawyers who are in different firms. Related
lawyers in the same firm are governed by RPC Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10. The disqualification stated in
RPC Rule 1.8(i) is personal and is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are
associated." Model Rule 1.8 comment. See generally Note, LegalEthics-Representation ofDiffering
Interests by Husband and Wife: Appearances of Impropriety and Unavoidable Conflicts of Interests?,
52 DEN. L.J. 735 (1975). A recent California case suggests that the Rule may well apply to lovers, as
well as spouses. In People v. Jackson, 167 Cal. App. 3d 829, 213 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1985), the court
reversed a conviction of assault with intent to commit rape because defense counsel was dating the
prosecutor. Although they were never married nor engaged to each other, did not ever live together, and
defense counsel never divulged confidential defense information to the prosecution, the court held that
appellate courts may not "indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of [resulting] prejudice when a
conviction is attacked on the ground that an appointed lawyer was influenced by a conflict of interest."'
Id., 213 Cal. Rptr. at 522. "Such an apparently close relationship between counsel directly opposing
each other in a criminal prosecution naturally and reasonably gives rise to speculation that the
professional judgment of counsel as well as the zealous representation to which an accused is entitled
has been compromised." 213 Cal.Rptr. at 523.
126. See also Estate of Shaughnessy, 104 Wn. 2d 89, 702 P.2d 132 (1985), decided prior to the
effective date of RPC Rule 1.8(c), holding the attorney entitled to recover fees in connection with a good
faith attempt to probate a lost will which he had drawn for a client, in which he was named executor, and
which contained gifts to him. However, the court stated that its holding:
does not mean we approve of attorneys drawing wills in which they are either executors or
beneficiaries or both. Even with a finding of good faith, as in this case, such actions cannot help but
engender suspicion and, as here, lengthy and expensive will contests. . . . [I]t is an activity of
which we disapprove, in which we believe no attorney should engage, and which should not occur
in the future.
Id. at 96-97, 702 P.2d at 136. Four dissenting justices would have held that "no fees of any nature
should accrue to the benefit of the lawyer," and that he "should not only not benefit from the estate, but
should not in any way benefit from the fruits of the estate, either by way of a bequest or having the estate
pay any part of his attorney's fees or a fee as personal representative." Id. at 97, 702 P.2d at 136-37
(Brachtenbach, J., dissenting).
127. RPC Rule 1.8(c).
128. RPC Rule 1.8(d). The conflict inherent in such literary or media rights agreements is not only
Washington Law Review Vol. 61:823, 1986
A lawyer may not advance or guarantee financial assistance to her client,
except that she may advance the expenses of litigation, provided that the
client remains ultimately liable for such expenses. 129 A lawyer may not
acquire a proprietary interest in a cause of action or subject matter of
litigation, except that the lawyer may "[a]cquire a lien granted by law to
secure the lawyer's fee or expense, 130 and [c]ontract with a client for a
reasonable contingent fee in a civil case. " 131 Where an attorney is properly
representing two or more parties, 132 she may not participate in making an
aggregate settlement of claims for or against the clients, or in criminal
cases an aggregate agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless
each client consents after consultation, including disclosure of the exis-
tence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and the participation of
each person in the settlement. 133
A lawyer may not make an agreement limiting the lawyer's liability to a
client for malpractice, unless permitted by law and the client is represented
by independent counsel or is informed in writing that independent repre-
sentation is appropriate. 134
ethically improper, but can also result in reversal of a criminal defendant's conviction on the basis of
ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 735, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (1980), superseded, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982) (criminal
defendant may waive conflict if the waiver is knowing and voluntary); People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App.
3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978).
129. RPC Rule 1.8(e). Expenses of litigation include "court costs, expenses of investigation,
expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence." Id.
130. See WASH. REV. CODE § 60.40.010 (1985). See also Ross v. Scannell, 97 Wn. 2d 598, 604,
647 P.2d 1004, 1007-08 (1982):
The statute in part is merely declaratory of the general or retaining lien recognized at common law.
This possessory and passive lien gives an attorney the right to retain papers and documents which
come into the attorney's possession during the course of his professional employment. It is a
possessory and passive lien and is not enforceable by foreclosure and sale.
The statute, however, also goes beyond the common law in recognizing the special or charging
lien. This lien is upon the judgment obtained for the client as a result of the attorney's professional
services to secure his compensation.
However, the statute is to be strictly construed, and does not permit attorneys' attaching liens to real
property for unadjudicated and unliquidated claims. Id. See WASH. REv. CODE § 60.40.010(4) (1985).
See also RPC Rule 1.15(d).
131. RPC Rule 1.80).
132. See RPC Rule 1.7(a)(1), (2), supra at text accompanying notes 107-19.
133. RPC Rule 1.8(g). It would appear, however, that RPC Rule 1.8(g) would not apply where the
interests of multiple claimants are separately represented. Cf. In re Lauderdale, 15 Wn. App. 321, 549
P.2d 42 (1976) (wrongful death settlement, involving claims of two minor children represented by a
guardian ad litem, and two adult children and a surviving spouse represented by counsel).
134. RPC Rule 1.8(h). Rarely, if ever, would an agreement limiting the lawyer's liability to the
client for malpractice be deemed to be appropriate. Such an agreement was strictly prohibited under
CPR DR 6-102(A), and it is unlikely, except in an unusual case, that a completely independent attorney
would be able to conscientiously recommend acceptance by the client of such an agreement.
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Rule 1.9 Conflict of Interest; Former Client
After the professional relationship with a client has terminated, the
lawyer's duty to avoid a conflict of interest is still applicable with respect to
future prospective clients. Thus, under RPC Rule 1.9, a lawyer who has
represented a client in a matter may not thereafter represent a second client
in the same or a substantially related matter135 in which that person's
interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client, unless
the former client consents in writing after consultation and a full disclosure
of the material facts. 136 Nor may the attorney use confidences or secrets
relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client,
except as RPC Rule 1.6 would permit. 137
The scope of a "matter" in relation to this rule depends on the particular
situation or transaction. If the lawyer has been directly involved in amatteror
specific transaction, subsequent representation of clients whose positions
are adverse to the former client is prohibited. 13 On the other hand, if the
lawyer has formerly represented a client in one matter and a subsequent
matter arises in which the lawyer is representing anew client in a new matter,
the position of which is adverse to the former client, but the transaction is not
related to the former representation in anyway, then the lawyermay represent
the subsequent client.139 A lawyer is bound by RPC Rule 1.6 to preserve all
135. See Kurbitz v. Kurbitz, 77 Wn. 2d 943, 468 P.2d 673 (1970).
136. Cases decided prior to the adoption of the Model Rules held that, since the disqualification in
RPC Rule 1.9(a) was intended to benefit the former client, it could be waived. See, e.g., In re Yam
Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1976).
137. RPC Rule 1.9(a), (b). The duty of loyalty is also implicated when an attorney switches sides
and opposes a former client on a matter in which the attorney provided legal advice. See, e.g., In re
Evans, 113 Ariz. 458, 556 P.2d 792 (1976).
138. See Model Rule 1.9 comment. The primary test is whether the former and present representa-
tion are "substantially related," so that the attorney could have obtained confidential information from
his former client beneficial to his present client. See, e.g., Intercapital Corp. of Or. v. Intercapital Corp.
of Wash., 41Wn. App. 9,700 P.2d 1213 (1985); Chugach Elec. Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 370
F.2d 441 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1967). See also Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc.,
708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983) (disqualification due to former representation so clearly required that law
firm should be sanctioned for bad faith resistance to the disqualification motion). However, since the
"substantial relationship" test presumes that confidential disclosures were made in the course of the
prior representation and that the lawyer would use the information adversely on behalf of the current
client, it is necessary to "examine the facts, circumstances and legal issues" raised in the former
representation. Realco Services, Inc. v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867, 872 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("The
disruption and prejudice that befall a client whose counsel is disqualified are reasons to avoid a hasty
conclusion in favor of disqualification, based merely on a 'doubt' about the propriety of the representa-
tion.").
139. Model Rule 1.9 comment. See, e.g., Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 646
F.2d 1020 (5th Cir.) (absent specific description of the prior matters, broker did not meet its burden of
proving that a "substantial relationship" existed between the present and prior matters), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 895 (1981).
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confidences and secrets of the former client. Thus, the lawyer must be careful
not to reveal information that is generally known when the application of
such information in a particular situation would be detrimental to the former
client and was gained in the former relationship. 140
Rule 1.10 Imputed Disqualification
The principles behind the disqualification of a single attorney, when a
conflict of interest arises, apply also to lawyers associated with firms, 141
and to the firm itself. When a conflict of interest arises, the firm or the
attorney should inform the client as to the possible conflict of interest and
explain the implications of the situation. The attorney or firm should
withdraw from the representation if possible, but if this is not possible, they
must obtain the client's informed consent to continue the representation.
An attorney leaving or joining a firm has a duty to former clients to avoid
any conflict of interest that might result from the attorney's past or present
affiliation with the firm. 142 Since attorneys in firms often consult with one
another, an attorney must ensure that the loyalty to a former or prospective
client is never jeopardized by revealing confidential information that could
compromise the client due to a conflict of interest. 143 Thus, while lawyers
are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client
when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so
by RPC Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9, or 2.2.'" Disqualification prescribed by
RPC Rule 1.10 may be waived by the affected client under the conditions
stated in RPC Rule 1.7.145
140. See Model Rule 1.6 comment, Model Rule 1.9 comment.
141. Model Rule 1.10 comment, provides:
For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the term "firm" includes lawyers in a private
firm, and lawyers employed in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in a
legal services organization. Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition
can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and
occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm.
However, if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct
themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rules.
See also Intercapital Corp. of Or. v. Intercapital Corp. of Wash., 41 Wn. App. 9, 700 P.2d 1213 (1985);
General Elec. Co. v. Valeron Corp., 428 F. Supp. 68 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (corporate law department);
Borden v. Borden, 277 A.2d 89 (D.C. 1971) (neighborhood legal services office).
142. See RPC Rule 1.10(b), (c). See also Schloetter v. Railoc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th
Cir. 1976) (former associates).
143. See RPC Rule 1.10(b), (c).
144. RPC Rule 1.10(a).
145. RPC Rule 1.10(d). Unlike RPC Rule 1.11, this Rule does not provide for "screening" as a
mechanism to avert disqualification, absent a waiver by the affected client. See, e.g., Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7thCir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). See infra
note 148 and accompanying text.
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Rule 1.11 Successive Government and Private Employment
The main purpose of this rule is to prevent the lawyer from using any
knowledge that was gained in confidence while a public employee to
benefit a client. 146 The same rules of confidentiality that apply to a client
should apply to knowledge gained while working for the government in a
professional capacity. Of course, this does not mean that an attorney cannot
use knowledge gained to which the public would also have access.
A lawyer may not represent a private client in connection with a matter in
which he participated "personally and substantially" as a public officer or
employee, unless the appropriate government agency consents after con-
sultation.147 If the lawyer is or becomes associated with a firm representing
a private client, no lawyer in the firm may represent the client unless the
disqualified lawyer does not participate in the matter (i.e., is "screened"' 148)
and receives no fees therefrom, and written notice is promptly given to the
appropriate agency.149
A lawyer may not, in the representation of a client, use any confidential
government information gained about a person while employed by a
government agency, when the client's position is adverse to that person.
The lawyer's firm may participate in the matter only if the lawyer is
"screened" as above. 150 A lawyer serving as a public officer or employee
may not participate in a matter in which she participated "personally and
substantially" while in private practice. Nor may she negotiate for private
employment with a party or its attorney in such a matter. 151
Rule 1.12 Former Judge or Arbitrator.
This rule deals substantially with the same issues found in RPC Rule
1.11. A judge or arbitrator who resigns and then enters private practice must
146. See generally Aronson, supra note 111, at 835-48.
147. RPC Rule 1.11(a). See generally Morgan, Appropriate Limits on Participation by a Former
Agency Official in Matters Before an Agency, 1980 DuKE L.J. 1.
148. See, e.g., City offHoquiam v. Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 29 Wn. App. 319,628
P.2d 1314 (1981), rev'd, 97 Wn. 2d 481, 646 P.2d 129 (1982). Screening has occasionally been referred
to as erecting a "Chinese Wall" between the the attorney and her partners and associates. See also
Lipton &Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the ConflictProblems of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L.
Rav. 459 (1975).
149. RPCRule l.11(a).
150. See id.;RPC Rule 1.11(b). With respect to the nature ofthe screening required, see Armstrong
v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
151. RPC Rule 1.11(c). "The purpose most often ascribed to the limitation of former government
attorneys is to avoid 'the manifest possibility that a former government lawyer's action as a public
official might be influenced (or open to the charge that it had been influenced) by the hope of later being
employed privately to uphold or upset what he had done."' Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d
804, 814 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics Formal Op. No. 37 (1981)).
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avoid a conflict of interest when dealing with a client. Thus, an attorney
may not represent a client in any matter in which she was judge or arbitrator
(or law clerk 52) while on the bench, unless all parties consent after
disclosure.153 The lawyer's firm is also disqualified, unless the require-
ments of the RPC Rule 1.10 exception to firm disqualification are met. 154
Ajudge or other judicial officer may not negotiate for employment with a
party or its attorney in a matter in which she is participating "personally
and substantially." A law clerk may not negotiate for employment with a
party or its attorney unless he has notified the judge or arbitrator in the
matter. 155
Rule 1.13 Client Under a Disability
When it becomes apparent to a lawyer that his client does not have the
ability to make informed decisions, due to mental disability, minority, or
for some other reason, the lawyer should try to maintain a normal client-
lawyer relationship. 156 However, if the lawyer reasonably believes the client
cannot adequately act in his own interest, he may seek to have a guardian
appointed for the client, or take other protective action. 157
Rule 1.14 Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client
Because of the fiduciary nature of the client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer
must separate from his own properties, and endeavor to keep safe, those
152. See, e.g., Hall v. Small Business Admin., 695 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983), a sexual discrimina-
tion class action. The law clerk for the federal magistrate to whom the case was assigned qualified as a
member of the plaintiff class and was totally convinced of the lawsuit's merits. She participated in the
pretrial proceedings. When the defendant's attorney called the magistrate's attention to this "house-
keeping problem," the law clerk opted out of the class. During trial, she took notes and prepared bench
memoranda for the judge. She subsequently, but just before the magistrate rendered his decision,
accepted a job with the plaintiff's lead counsel. The magistrate denied the defendant's motion to vacate
the judgment and recuse himself, describing the law clerk as "little more than an amanuensis" in the
case, adding: "I don't think that any female law clerk is going to give me a lot of input on how to decide a
case." Id. at 178. The Fifth Circuit reversed, stating that a "clerk is forbidden to do all that is prohibited
to the judge." Id. at 179.
153. RPC Rule 1.12(a).
154. RPC Rule 1.12(c).
155. RPC Rule 1.12(b).
156. RPC Rule 1.13(a). See generally Brakel, The Role of the Lawyer in the Mental Health Field,
1977 AM. BAR FoUND. RESFARCH J. 467; Mickenberg, The Silent Clients: Legal andEthical Considera-
tions in Representing Severely and Profoundly Retarded Individuals, 31 STAN. L. REV. 625 (1979); Kay
& Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Non-Polar Approach, 61 GEo. L.J.
1401 (1973).
157. RPC Rule 1.13(b). In addition, "[i]f the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the
ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an
obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Rule 1.2(d)." Model Rule 1. 14 comment.
See also In re Quesnell, 83 Wn. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1973).
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funds and other properties belonging to the client. This is not merely an
aspirational goal; any violation of the rules governing use of a client's
property will subject a lawyer to substantial discipline, even if no actual
loss has occurred. 158 In addition, in the event of any loss of-such funds, the
lawyer is subject to personal liability whether or not she profited personally
in any respect.
A lawyer must give prompt notice to the client of receipt of the client's
funds or other properties, identify and label them properly and place them
in a safe place (for example, a safe deposit box), maintain complete records
and render appropriate accounts to the client about them, and pay promptly
or deliver upon request the funds or other properties. 159 As a basic protec-
tion, all funds belonging in whole or in part to the client must be deposited
in a separate account, and the only funds belonging to the lawyer or firm
which may be deposited there are funds sufficient to pay bank charges. 160
Client funds must be deposited in one or more interest-bearing accounts,
normally separate accounts for each client or a pooled account with
subaccounting to compute the interest owed to each client. 161
Funds that are nominal in amount or held for a short period of time must
be placed in a pooled interest-bearing account. 162 The interest accruing on
this account, less any transaction costs, must be paid to The Legal Founda-
tion of Washington, established by the Washington Supreme Court to
administer such IOLTA (Interest on Lawyer Trust Account) funds. 163 The
lawyer may, but need not, notify the client of the intended use of such
funds.164 This entire procedure, implemented in many jurisdictions, has
been upheld against constitutional challenge by state supreme courts. 165
The United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari with respect to a
158. See, e.g., In re Moynihan, 97 Wn. 2d 237, 643 P.2d 439 (1982). Disbarment is the usual
sanction. In re Vetter, 104 Wn. 2d 779,711 P.2d 284 (1985);In re Sawyer, 98 Wn. 2d 584,656 P.2d 503
(1983).
159. RPC Rule 1.14(b)(1)-(4). See also In reDeschane, 84Wn. 2d514, 527 P.2d 683 (1974);Inre
Kennedy, 80 Wn. 2d 222, 492 P.2d 1364 (1972).
160. RPC Rule 1. 14(a).
161. RPC Rule 1.14(c).
162. Id.
163. The substantial amounts transferred to the Legal Foundation are employed to fund public
interest programs such as legal aid programs, loans for law students, and programs designed to improve
the administration of justice.
164. RPC Rule 1.14(c)(1).
165. See, e.g., Carroll v. State Bar, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1193,213 Cal. Rptr. 305, cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 142 (1985); In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 395-96 (Fla. 1981) (use of client
money in this manner not a "taking" of the funds from client without compensation in violation of fifth
and fourteenth Amendments). The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that the interest income from
trust accounts is tax exempt if used for the public service purposes indicated supra note 163. See Rev.
Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16.
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challenge to the California IOLTA plan. 166 In determining whether client
funds should be deposited in such an IOLTA account or an interest-bearing
account, a lawyer should consider whether the funds are likely to provide a
net return to the client, including such factors as the amount of interest the
funds are likely to earn, the cost of establishing and administering the
account, and the capability of the financial institutions to calculate and pay
interest to individual clients. 167
Where fixed portions of the funds received become due and owing to the
lawyer as fees or for expenses, he is authorized to withdraw such portions
so long as the client does not dispute the sums. 168 If there is any dispute, the
disputed amount must remain in the separate client account pending
resolution of the controversy. 169 In order to ensure compliance with the
provisions of RPC Rule 1.14, the State Bar Board of Governors may audit
any lawyer's books at any time and for any reason. The lawyer must
cooperate with such audits, and must complete, execute, and deliver to the
State Bar an annual written declaration or questionnaire on or before the
specified date of delivery. 170
Rule 1.15 Declining or Terminating Representation
Before attempting to terminate the relationship at any stage of the
proceedings, the lawyer has three general responsibilities. First, if permis-
sion for withdrawal is required by the rules of a tribunal, such permission
must be obtained from the tribunal prior to withdrawing from the case. 17'
166. Carroll v. State Bar, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 213 Cal. Rptr. 305, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 142
(1985).
167. RPC Rule 1.14(c)(3)(i)-(iii).
168. RPC Rule 1.14(a). Prior to the adoption of the RPC, Washington permitted, under CPR DR
9-102(A)(2), a lawyer to assert a lien and deduct sums equal to the amount owed the lawyer from the
trust funds without consent by the client. See Crane Co. v. Paul, 15 Wn. App. 212,548 P.2d 337 (1976).
See also Ross v. Scannell, discussed supra note 130.
169. See supra note 168. Model Rule 1.15 comment also provides:
Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. If there
is risk that the client may divert the funds without paying the fee, the lawyer is not required to remit
the portion from which the fee is to be paid. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a
client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds should be kept in
trust and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration.
The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed.
170. RLD Rules 13.1-13.3.
171. See, e.g., Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wn. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975). Model Rule 1.16
comment provides:
When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval
of the appointing authority. See also Rule 6.2. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is
based on the client's demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. The court may
wish an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the
facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement that professional consid-
erations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient.
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Second, the lawyer must take whatever reasonable steps are necessary to
avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client. 172 Such steps include
providing reasonable notice, allowing time to employ other counsel, deliv-
ering all papers and properties to the client, and cooperating with any
counsel subsequently employed. In Washington, retaining liens, whereby
the attorney retains client papers and properties, are permissible so long as
the client is not thereby deprived of material necessary to his legal repre-
sentation. 173 For example, suppose that attorney X is representing both the
passenger and the driver of a passenger vehicle in a personal injury case
againstA. X discovers a conflict in his representation due to A's assertion of
contributory negligence as a defense. X therefore decides to withdraw from
the driver's case. X must inform the driver of his decision and obtain all
necessary continuances so that the driver will have time to obtain a new
attorney. X must also return to the driver all documents and other property
belonging to her and assist her new attorney to the extent possible.
Another example is where attorney X represented B in her arguably
frivolous personal injury action. Following dismissal of the case for failure
to state a claim, client wishes to appeal. Before X may withdraw to avoid
violation of RPC Rule 3.1, he must either file a notice of appeal or inform B
of the need to file such notice and the time limit in which it must be filed.
Third, the attorney must return any part of a fee that was paid in advance
and has not been earned at the time of termination.
The Washington RPC distinguish between situations in which the at-
torney must withdraw (mandatory withdrawal) and situations where she is
permitted to withdraw (permissive withdrawal). Withdrawal is mandatory
(after obtaining permission from the tribunal when required by law) if: (1)
the lawyer knows or it becomes obvious that continued employment will
violate the RPC or other law; 174 (2) the lawyer's mental or physical
condition materially impairs her ability to represent her client; 175 or (3) the
172. See RPCRule 1.15(b), (d). As statedinHansen, 14Wn. App. at97, 538 P.2dat 1251: "Whena
lawyer. . . withdraw[s] for cause, a duty remains to protect the client. The attorney must give notice of
withdrawal, suggest employment of other counsel, return papers and property to which the client is
entitled, cooperate with succeeding counsel, refund compensation not earned and minimize the
possibility of harm to the client."
173. See WASH. REV. CODE § 60.40.010 (1985). See also Ross v. Scannell, 97 Wn. 2d 598, 647
P.2d 1004 (1982), discussed supra note 130; Academy of Calif. Optometrists v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.
App. 3d 999, 124 Cal. Rptr. 668, 672 (1975); Goldsmith v. Pyramid Communications, 362 F. Supp.
694, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
174. RPC Rule 1. 15(a)(l). Although a lawyer must ordinarily withdraw if the client demands that
the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the RPC, the lawyer is not required to withdraw
simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; "a client may make such a suggestion in the
hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation." Model Rule 1.16 comment.
175. RPC Rule 1. 15(a)(2). ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DIscIPLE AND DISABILY PROCEEDINGS
(1983), Standards 12.1-12.6, provide that, even absent a pending ethics charge, a lawyer can be
transferred to inactive status, amounting to a suspension from practice, if it is shown that a "mental or
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client discharges the lawyer.176
If grounds for mandatory withdrawal do not exist, the lawyer may
withdraw if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse
effect on the legitimate interests of the client, or if:177
(1) The client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that
the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent; 78
physical condition prevents him from competently representing the interests of his clients .
RLD 10.2 provides for discretionary transfer (following a hearing) to disability inactive status when "it
appears to a review committee that there is reasonable cause to believe that an active lawyer is unable
adequately to practice law because of insanity, mental illness, senility, excessive use of alcohol or
drugs, or other mental or physical incapacity . Under RLD Rule 10.1, transfer to disability
inactive status is automatic if an active lawyer:
(1) has been found to be incapable of assisting in his or her own defense in a criminal action; or (2)
has been acquitted of a crime on the ground of insanity; or (3) has had a guardian (but not a limited
guardian) appointed for his or her person or estate upon a finding of incompetency; or (4) has been
found to be mentally incapable of conducting the practice of law in any other jurisdiction ....
In In re Ryan, 97 Wn. 2d 284,644 P.2d 675 (1982), the attorney had been in private practice for over
two years, but refused any new cases after about 20 months, believing "that many of the cases he was
handling were fabricated or did not represent actual cases or controversies." He also believed that
family and friends were referring "bogus" cases to him. He filed a lawsuit against numerous persons
whom he alleged had "staged" a case he was handling. When the Disciplinary Board began an
investigation, he filed a second lawsuit against numerous former clients, lawyers and an insurance
company. Id. at 285-87, 644 P.2d at 675-76. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the Disciplinary
Board's recommendation that the attorney be suspended, since, "if restored to active status, [he] might
make irrational judgments concerning the merits of cases brought before him and might continue to
subject clients to litigation based on allegations of conspiracy and fabrication." The court concluded:
Ryan asserts that an attorney can be transferred to inactive status upon a finding of mental illness
or other mental incapacity and that such terms are too vague to withstand a constitutional
challenge. Ryan overlooks, however, the qualifying condition of the rule that the mental condition
must cause the attorney to be unable to conduct his/her law practice adequately. . . .Thus, the
bar must establish that an attorney is unable to conduct the practice of law adequately because of
insanity, mental illness, senility, excessive use of alcohol or drugs, or other mental inca-
pacity. . . .Given the inherently uncertain nature of mental illness and the broad ranges of the
practice of law, we fail to perceive how a more definite standard could be articulated.
Id. at 287-88, 644 P.2d at 677.
176. RPC Rule 1.15(a)(3). Model Rule 1.16 comment states:
A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability
for payment for the lawyer's services. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be
anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the circumstances.
177. RPC Rule 1.15(b). As the "or if" language of the Rule indicates, the attorney may withdraw
under any of the enumerated grounds, even if withdrawal cannot be accomplished "without material
adverse effect on the legitimate interests of the client." However, the attorney must still "take steps to
the extent reasonably practicable to protect [the] client's interests." RPC Rule 1. 15(d).
178. RPC Rule 1.15(b)(1). See, e.g., Knapp v. McFarland, 457 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.) (inconsistent
statements by client in separate litigations), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972). See generally Gruen-
baum, Corporate/Securities Lawyers: Disclosure Responsibility, Liability to Investors and National
Student Marketing Corp., 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 795, 816 & n. 108 (1979); Cappuccio, Ethical Problems
of the Tax Practitioner in New Jersey, 9 SEroN HALL L. REv. 177, 190-97 (1978); Evans, Bialkin,
Cooney, Shipman & Van Dusen, Responsibility of Lawyers Advising Mangagement, 30 Bus. LAw. 13,
17 (1975).
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(2) The client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud; 179
(3) The client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers
repugnant or imprudent; 80
(4) The client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding
the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer
will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;' 8'
(5) The representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the
lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or 82
(6) Other good cause for withdrawal exists. 183
The court may order an attorney to continue representation regardless of
any grounds for withdrawal. The lawyer should continue representation to
the best of his ability within the framework of the RPC.184
TITLE II. COUNSELOR
Rule 2.1 Advisor
Often attorneys only advise their clients as to legal courses of action
available to the client. However, other considerations, such as moral,
political, economic, and social factors, may be relevant to a client's
situation. In giving advice to a client, the attorney may refer to such factors
when suggesting alternative courses of action. 185
179. RPC Rule 1.15(b)(2). Model Rule 1.16 comment states:
Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably
believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such conduct
even if the lawyer does not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer's services were
misused in the past even if that would materially prejudice the client.
180. RPC Rule 1.15(b)(3).
181. RPC Rule 1.15(b)(4).
182. RPC Rule 1.15(b)(5).
183. RPC Rule 1.15(b)(6).
184. RPC Rule 1.15(c). Permission may be denied if withdrawal would adversely affect opposing
parties or impede the administration ofjustice; e.g., withdrawal on the eve of litigation. See, e.g., Ripoll
v. Kenin, 303 So. 2d 83 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974); Brothers v. Burt, 27 N.Y.2d 905, 265 N.E.2d 922, 317
N.Y.S.2d 626 (1970). When withdrawal is based on a client's unlawful conduct, it is improper (except
in criminal cases) to require the lawyer to continue. See, e.g., In re A., 276 Or.* 225, 554 P.2d 479
(1976).
185. • RPC Rule 2.1. Model Rule 2.1 comment also provides:
Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of another profession.
Family matters can involve problems within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical
psychology or social work; business matters can involve problems within the competence of the
accounting profession or of financial specialists. Where consultation with a professional in another
field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a
recommendation. At the same time, a lawyer's advice at its best often consists of recommending a
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Rule 2.2 Intermediary
A lawyer acts as an intermediary 86 when he represents 187 two or more
parties with potentially conflicting interests. 188 One of the factors examined
to see if the lawyer is acting as an intermediary is the sharing of the
responsibility for the lawyer's fees by the parties. 189 When acting as an
intermediary, the lawyer must take certain precautions to avoid a conflict of
interest. The lawyer has a duty to inform each of the clients of the
implications of common representation, including the risks and advantages
involved, and the effect on the attorney-client privilege. 190 In addition, the
lawyer must obtain each client's consent to the common representation. 191
The lawyer's duty to provide adequate representation requires that the
lawyer should not act as an intermediary unless he reasonably believes that
he will be able to act in the best interests of each client. 192 The lawyer also
course of action in the face of conflicting recommendations of experts. See generally Williams,
Professionalism and the Corporate Bar, 36 Bus. LAW. 159 (1980); Lehman, The Pursuit of a
Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1078 (1979); Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958).
186. "[F]or example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepre-
neurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an
interest, arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate or mediating a dispute between
clients." Model Rule 2.2 comment.
187. Thus, according to Model Rule 2.2 comment:
The Rule does not apply to a lawyer acting as arbitrator or mediator between or among parties who
are not clients of the lawyer, even where the lawyer has been appointed with the concurrence of the
parties. In performing such a role the lawyer may be subject to applicable codes of ethics, such as
the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint Committee of the
American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association.
188. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 112-16. Examples of cases in which an attorney's
potential conflict of interest was considered in relation to dual representation include: Halvorsen v.
Halvorsen, 3 Wn. App. 827,479 P.2d 161 (1970) (spouses seeking separation or dissolution); In re Kali,
116 Ariz. 285, 569 P.2d 227 (1977) (lender and borrower); Craft Builders, Inc. v. Ellis D. Taylor, Inc.,
254 A.2d 233 (Del. 1969) (buyer and seller); In re Lanza, 65 N.J. 347, 322 A.2d 445 (1974)
(formulating and committing detailed agreement to writing).
189. Model Rule 2.2 comment.
190. RPC Rule 2.2(a)(1). Model Rule 2.2 comment states: "With regard to the attorney-client
privilege, the prevailing rule is that as between commonly represented clients the privilege does not
attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not
protect any such communications, and the clients should be so advised. "See also R. ARONSON, supra
note 85, at V-5.
191. RPC Rule 2.2(a)(1). As indicated supra at note 119 and accompanying text, the consent
obtained must be based on full disclosure, including an explanation of the problems that could arise
from potential conflicting interests and the desirability of obtaining the advice of independent counsel.
See, e.g., Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn. 2d 581, 675 P.2d 193 (1983); Sayler v.
Elberfeld Mfg. Co., 30 Wn. App. 955, 639 P.2d 785 (1982); Florida Bar v. Teitelman, 261 So. 2d 140
(Fla. 1972). See generally Aronson, supra note 111, at 826-27 and authorities cited therein.
192. RPC Rule 2.2(a)(2). The Rule also requires that the lawyer reasonably believe "that each
client will be able to make adequately informed decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of
material prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful."
The attorney may not favor the interests of one of the clients or abandon one client to protect the other.
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must reasonably believe that the common representation will not interfere
with his responsibilities and that he can maintain impartiality. 193 The
lawyer must withdraw if requested by any client or if he can no longer fulfill
his ethical obligations. In that event, he may not represent any of the
clients. 194
Rule 2.3 Evaluation for Use by Third Persons
A lawyer may undertake an evaluation 195 of a matter for someone other
than the client 196 if the undertaking of the evaluation will not cause a
conflict of interest or otherwise harm the client, and the client consents
after consultation. Any information relating to the evaluation is protected
under RPC Rule 1.6.197
Klemm v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1977); Attorney Grievance Comm.
v. Lockhart, 285 Md. 586, 403 A.2d 1241 (1979).
193. RPC Rule 2.2(a)(3). Model Rule 2.2 comment states:
In considering whether to act as intermediary between clients, a lawyer should be mindful that if
the intermediation fails the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. In
some situations the risk of failure is so great that intermediation is plainly impossible. For
example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients between whom contentious
litigation is imminent or who contemplate contentious negotiations. More generally, if the
relationship between the parties has already assumed definite antagonism, the possibility that the
clients' interests can be adjusted by intermediation ordinarily is not very good.
In addition, the lawyer's ability to serve as mediator may depend upon whether he has greater loyalty to
either of the clients: "For example, a lawyer who has represented one of the clients for a long period and
in a variety of matters might have difflilculty being impartial between that client and one to whom the
lawyer has only recently been introduced." Id. See also Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wn. 2d 293,
303, 494 P.2d 208, 214 (1972).
194. RPC Rule 2.2(c). See, e.g., Brennan's v. Brennan's Restaurant, Inc., 590 F.2d 168 (5th Cir.
1979).
195. [F]or example, an opinion concerning the title of property rendered at the behest of a
vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of a borrower for the
information of a prospective lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required by a
government agency; for example, an opinion concerning the legality of the securities registered for
sale under the securities laws. In other instances, the evaluation may be required by a third person,
such as a purchaser of a business.
Model Rule 2.3 comment.
196. An evaluation ofa client for use by a third party should be distinguished from an investigation
of a third party on behalf of a client:
For example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to analyze a vendor's title to property does not have a
client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, an investigation into a person's affairs by a
government lawyer, or by special counsel employed by the government, is not an evaluation as that
term is used in this Rule. The question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs
are being examined.
Model Rule 2.3 comment.
197. See RPC Rule 2.3. The duty to protect confidentiality may sometimes conflict with the
attorney's obligations to those who will rely on the evaluation not to provide information that is
misleading or fraudulent. See Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128
Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976); ABA, Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests
for Information, 31 Bus. LAW. 1709, 1711-12, 1715 (1976).
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TITLE III. ADVOCATE
Rule 3.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions
Advocates deal with past conduct and must take the facts as they find
them. They should therefore resolve all doubts as to the bounds of the law in
favor of the client. 198 In furtherance of the client's cause, an advocate may
urge any permissible construction of the law that is favorable to the client
without regard to the likelihood of success. The advocate, however, may
never assert a frivolous position in litigation. Frivolous in this context
means that the position is supported neither by the existing law nor by a
good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse the existing law. How-
ever, in a criminal case, defense counsel may defend so as to require that
every element of the charge is established. 199
Rule 3.2 Expediting Litigation
A lawyer should not engage in delaying tactics during litigation when the
only purpose is to frustrate, harass, or maliciously injure another. Delay
198. See CPR EC 7-3. "[A] lawyer who is asked to advise his client ... may freely urge the
statement of positions most favorable to the client just as long as there is reasonable basis for those
positions." ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics Formal Op. 314 (1965). As stated in ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics Formal Op. 280 (1949):
The lawyer. . . is not an umpire, but an advocate. He is under no duty to refrain from making
every proper argument in support of any legal point because he is not convinced of its inherent
soundness. . . .His personal belief in the soundness of his cause or of the authorities supporting
it, is irrelevant.
199. See RPC Rule 3.1. Model Rule 3.1 comment provides:
The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely
because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop
vital evidence only by discovery. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that
the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the client
desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a
person or if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action
taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or
reversal of existing law.
At the same time, federal and state court rules of civil procedure require that an attorney sign each
pleading and that such signature constitutes a certification that, to the best of the attorney's knowledge
and belief, there is good ground to support the pleading and that it is not interposed for purposes of
delay. Willful violations of the rule are stated to be grounds for disciplinary action. See FED. R. Civ. P.
11; WASH. R. CIv. P. 11. Despite infrequent enforcement of Rule I1 in the past, the trend is to impose
sanctions on attorneys who simply "buy" time for their clients without any hope of ultimate success for
their cause. See, e.g., Textor v. Board of Regents, 87 F.R.D. 751 (N.D. Il1. 1980) (failure of plaintiff's
attorney to correct an overly broad complaint); In re National Student Mktg. Litig., 78 F.R.D. 726
(D.D.C. 1978) (Rule 11 also applicable to counterclaims), aff'd, 663 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Miller
v. Schweickart, 413 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (complaint based only on unverified rumor and
hearsay); Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (plaintiff's
naming of 177 mortgage and thrift institutions as class action defendants when plaintiff did not know
until after discovery began which of the named defendants actually followed the alleged practices;
plaintiff's counsel required to pay personally the costs and expenses of the dismissed defendants).
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should only be used when it is necessary to further the client's legitimate
interests, and does not include delay for the sole purpose of realizing a
financial or other benefit. 200
Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal
A lawyer is responsible for the preparation and compilation of docu-
ments and pleadings in litigation and judicial proceedings. Ordinarily, a
lawyer is not required to have personal knowledge of all the facts and
representations contained in these documents if the lawyer, as an advocate,
is representing a client in a matter and the assertions are made on behalf of
the client.201 However, when a lawyer is making assertions based on his
own knowledge, such as in an affidavit or an open representation in court,
he must make reasonably diligent inquiries to ascertain the truthfulness of
the assertions. 202 There may be instances where failure to make a disclosure
of a fact that an attorney knows to be false will be equivalent to an
affirmative misrepresentation. 203
RPC Rule 3.3 provides that a lawyer may not knowingly make a false
statement of material fact or law to a tribunal,2°4 or "[flail to disclose a
material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by the client unless such disclosure is prohibited
by [RPC R]ule 1.6.-"205 The lawyer also may not knowingly fail to disclose
200. See RPC Rule 3.2 and Model Rule 3.2 comment. According to the Model Rule Comment, the
test is "whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having
some substantial purpose other than delay."
201. Model Rule 3.3 comment.
202. Id.
203. Id.; see, e.g., Matter of Witt, 96 Wn. 2d 56, 633 P.2d 880 (1981); In re Hubert, 265 Or. 27,
507 P.2d 1141 (1973).
204. RPC Rule 3.3(a)(1). As stated in In re Schildhaus, 23 A.D.2d 152, 259 N.Y.S.2d 631,
635-36, aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 748, 262 N.Y.S.2d 118, 209 N.E.2d 732 (1965):
The lawyer's function in the administration of justice requires a rigid adherence on his part to [the
rule] prescribing candor and fairness in all dealings with the court. The deliberate effort on the part
of a lawyer to mislead the court in a material manner, whether by express misrepresentations,
unfair and evasive tactics or other irresponsible means, has a tendency to obstruct justice; and there
can be no justification for the same.
The duty of candor and fairness is also applicable on appeal, where the court:
is entitled to a fair statement of the facts from attorneys . . . not an exaggerated, self serving
version. . . or an omission of crucial facts. When the Court finds that it can not rely upon the
statement of a lawyer, the lawyer has lost his effectiveness with the Court and has therefore, in fact,
injured his client.
Cooper v. State, 309 N.E.2d 807, 808 (Ind. 1974). Accord Frausto v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 563 F.2d 1324
(9th Cir. 1977).
205. RPC Rule 3.3(a)(2) (emphasis added). See In re Vetter, 104 Wn. 2d 779, 784-87, 711 P.2d
284, 287-89 (1985). This Rule, by its reference to RPC Rule 1.6, would appear to create some
ambiguity, since RPC Rule 1.6(b)(1) permits the revelation of confidences or secrets "to the extent the
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to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the
lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed
by the opposing counsel.206 The theory behind this rule is that the purpose
of litigation is to promote truth and justice. The lawyer is not required to
advocate the controlling authority, and may argue that it should be dis-
tiguished or its application to the present case abandoned, but it still must
be acknowledged so that an informed decision may be made.
Further, the lawyer is prohibited from offering evidence that the lawyer
knows to be false, including perjured testimony. 207 If the lawyer reasonably
believes evidence is false, she may refuse to offer it.208 In addition, if the
lawyer comes to know that offered material evidence was false, she must
promptly disclose this knowledge to the tribunal unless prohibited under
RPC Rule 1.6,209 in which case she may seek to withdraw. 210 Although the
above duties are clear in most situations, the lawyer's duty when a criminal
defendant intends to commit perjury is unclear.211 The conflict between the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary" to prevent the commission of a crime. Thus, in a roundabout
way, RPC Rules 1.6 and 3.3(a)(2) would appear to require revelation to a tribunal of material facts
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal act, butprohibit revelation ofa material fact if necessary to avoid
assisting the client's fraudulent act. Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) does not include the phrase "unless such
disclosure is prohibited by rule 1.6." Rather, Model Rule 3.3(b) provides that the duties under RPC
Rule 3.3(a) "continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires
disclosure of information otherwise protected by rule 1.6."
206. RPC Rule 3.3(a)(3).
207. RPC Rule 3.3(a)(4). See State v. Lavaris, 41 Wn. App. 856, 859 n.1, 707 P.2d 134, 136 n.1
(1985). For a definition of "knows," as employed in the RPC, see supra note 56.
208. RPC Rule 3.3(e). As employed in the RPC, "reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes"
"denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in questicn and that the circumstances are such that the
belief is reasonable." Terminology section, RPC. This is, at least in part, a subjective standard, as
opposed to "reasonably should know", which "denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and
competence would ascertain the matter in question"-an objective standard. Id.
209. RPC Rule 3.3(c). In State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136, 141 (1970) (footnote
omitted), the court stated:
While as a general rule counsel is not allowed to disclose information imparted to him by his client
or acquired during their professional relation, unless authorized to do so by the client himself, the
announced intention of a client to commit perjury, or any other crime, is not included within the
confidences which an attorney is bound to respect.
210. RPC Rule 3.3(d). See, e.g., In re A., 276 Or. 225, 554 P.2d 479 (1976); In re Malloy, 248
N.W.2d 43 (N.D. 1976); Committee on Professional Ethics v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1976).
Before seeking to withdraw, however, the lawyer must first "make reasonable efforts to convince the
client to consent to disclosure." RPC Rule 3.3(d).
211. See RPC Rule 3.3(g): "Constitutional law defining the right to assistance of counsel in
criminal cases may supersede the obligations stated in this rule." See also Model Rule 3.3 comment;
Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978), discussed infra note 215 and accompanying text.
Since a defendant in a criminal case has an absolute right to testify in his own defense, and since any
action by defense counsel implying that his testimony is false could implicate the defendant's rights to
effective assistance of counsel and due process, the attorney is placed in a virtually unresolvable
dilemma.
Three resolutions of this dilemma have been proposed. One is to permit the accused to testify by
a narrative without guidance through the lawyer's questioning. This compromises both contending
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duty of confidentiality and a criminal defendant's right to testify in his own
behalf, versus the duty of candor to the tribunal, has yet to be resolved. 212
In one such case, attorneyX representedA in atrial (whereinA was found
guilty) on the charge of possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner. Prior
to trial, A told X that the knives that were in his possession had belonged to
him. After the trial, A told X that he thought he could find some people to
testify on his behalf. X acted properly in refusing to assistA by appealing or
moving for a new trial based on this "new" evidence. 213
In another case, X represented a criminal defendant charged with
murder. When the defendant surprised X by falsely testifying that she had
not been present at the scene of the murder, X followed the ABA Standards
Relating to the Defense Function214 in obtaining a recess, advising the
defendant against perjuring herself, moving to withdraw when she refused
this advice, and, upon denial of the motion, ceasing to question her further
and not arguing her credibility during closing argument. The appellate
court held thatX's conduct improperly indicated his belief to the trial judge
(who, in the absence of a jury, was the trier of fact) that his client was lying,
and thereby X violated the defendant's right to due process. 215
principles; it exempts the lawyer from the duty to disclose false evidence but subjects the client to
an implicit disclosure of information imparted to counsel. Another suggested resolution, of
relatively recent origin, is that the advocate be entirely excused from the duty to reveal perjury if
the perjury is that of the client. This is a coherent solution but makes the advocate a knowing
instrument of perjury.
The other resolution of the dilemma is that the lawyer must reveal the client's perjury if
necessary to rectify the situation. A criminal accused has a right to the assistance of an advocate, a
right to testify and a right of confidential communication with counsel. However, an accused
should not have a right to assistance of counsel in committing perjury. Furthermore, an advocate
has an obligation, not only in professional ethics but under the law as well, to avoid implication in
the commission of perjury or other falsification of evidence. See RPC Rule 1.2(d).
Model Rule 3.3 comment. Itshould benoted, however, thatthe Commentis based onModel Rule 3.3(b),
which requires disclosure "even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by
rule 1.6." RPC Rule 3.3(a)(2), (c) & (d), however, provide the opposite, i.e., "unless such disclosure is
prohibited by rule 1.6." Notes 29-38 and accompanying text, supra, compare and critique these
contrasting positions. For a comparison of the varying points of view on this issue, see Aronson, supra
note 36, at 314-20 (and authorities cited therein); Rieger, Client Perjury: A Proposed Resolution of the
Constitutional andEthicallssues, 70 MiNN. L. REv. 121 (1985); Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50S. CAL. L.
REV. 809 (1977); Brazil, UnanticipatedClientPerjuryandthe Collision ofRules ofEthics, Evidence, and
Constitutional Law, 44 Mo. L. REv. 601 (1979). For judicial treatment of the dilemma, see, e.g., United
States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1984); People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1981); State v.
Fosnight, 235 Kan. 52,679 P.2d 174 (1984); Matter of Goodwin, 279 S.C. 274,305 S.E.2d 578 (1983).
212. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, reh'g en banc denied, 750 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd
sub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
213. In re Branch, 70 Cal. 2d 200, 449 P.2d 174, 74 Cal. Rptr. 238.(1969).
214. See ABA STANDARDS RELATNG TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTON
(Approved Draft 1971). This provision was subsequently withdrawn and an essentially similar provi-
sion, ABA STANDARDS RELATiNG TO THE ADMimsTRATioN OF CRIMINAL JusTICE, Defense Function
Standard 4-7.7 (2d ed., Tent. Draft, Approved 1979), could not be agreed upon by the ABA.
215. Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Finally, in Nix v. Whiteside,216 an attorney represented a criminal defen-
dant charged with murder. The defendant alleged self-defense. When the
defendant proposed to testify falsely 217 that the victim attacked him with a
gun, counsel threatened to withdraw and inform the trial court, and stated
that he "probably would be allowed to attempt to impeach that particular
testimony." 218 The defendant testified, but said nothing about the gun,219
and was convicted. On appeal by the client of the denial of his federal
habeas corpus petition, the Eighth Circuit reversed his conviction on the
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. 220 The United States Supreme
Court reversed, reinstating the conviction.221 Although the Court's holding
was unanimous 222 that the defendant was not denied effective assistance of
counsel, in concurring opinions, four justices clearly indicated that the
decision should not be read to establish the required-or even uniformly
proper-attorney response to a criminal defendant's intended perjury. 223
216. 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
217. The federal courts accepted the state court assumption that the defendant's proposed testi-
mony, concerning seeing something "metallic" in the victim's hand, was false. 106 S. Ct. at 993. it is at
least arguable that defense counsel had an insufficient basis to refuse to present the evidence on the mere
suspicion of its falsity. See 106 S. Ct. at 1007 (Stevens, J., concurring).
218. 106 S. Ct. at 997 n.7.
219. In fact, on cross-examination, the defendant admitted that he had not actually seen a gun in the
victim's hand. Id. at 992.
220. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, rehearing en banc denied, 750 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1984),
rev'd sub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
221. 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
222. The basis for the decision was that, under the two-pronged test of Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), counsel's conduct in successfully dissuading his client from committing the crime
of perjury "fell within the wide range of professional responses to threatened client perjury acceptable
under the Sixth Amendment," Nix, 106 S. Ct. at 994, and there was no prejudice in that "Whiteside has
no valid claim that confidence in the result of his trial has been diminished by his desisting from the
contemplated perjury." Id. at 999.
223. See 106 S. Ct. at 1007 (Stevens, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
stated:
When examining attorney conduct, a court must be careful not to narrow the range of conduct
acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards
of professional conduct and thereby intrude into the State's proper authority to define and apply the
standards of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to practice in its courts. In some
future case challenging attorney conduct in the course of a state court trial, we may need to define
with greater precision the weight to be given to recognized canons of ethics, the standards
established by the State in statutes or profesional codes, and the Sixth Amendment, in defining the
proper scope and limits on that conduct. Here we need not face that question, since virtually all of
the sources speak with one voice.
Id. at 994. Interestingly, the court cited (along with numerous additional authorities) CPR DR
7-102(B)(1) and Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) as requiring counsel's disclosure of client perjury to the court
"even if disclosure compromises client confidences." Id. at 995. Since Washington amended Model
Rule 3.3, replacing the quoted language with the language, "unless such disclosure is prohibited by
rule 1.6," Washigton defense counsel's duty is not so clear. See supra note 205 and acompanying text;
see also Survey Comment, Confidentiality, supra note 3.
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Rather, as stated by Justice Brennan:224
This Court has no constitutional authority to establish rules of ethical
conduct for lawyers practicing in the state courts. Nor does the Court enjoy
any statutory grants of jurisdiction over legal ethics.
Unfortunately, the court seems unable to resist the temptation of sharing
with the legal community its vision of ethical conduct. But let there be no
mistake: the Court's essay regarding what constitutes the correct response to a
criminal client's suggestion that he will perjure himself is pure discourse
without force of law. . . . [T]hat issue is a thorny one,. . . but it is not an
issue presented by this case. Lawyers, judges, bar associations, students and
others should understand that the problem has not now been "decided."
Rule 3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel
Though ill feelings may exist between clients, such feelings should not
influence a lawyer in his conduct, attitude, and demeanor toward opposing
lawyers. A lawyer should not make unfair or derogatory personal refer-
ences to opposing counsel,2 25 and should accede to reasonable requests
regarding court proceedings, continuances, waiver of procedural for-
malities, and similar matters which do not prejudice the rights of clients.
Whereas the lawyer is required to zealously defend the client, RPC Rule
3.4 delineates certain courses of action which the lawyer may not use in
representing a client. Again, the underlying theory behind this rule is that
justice can only be served when truthful disclosure of the facts is made
known to the trier of fact in an efficient manner. First, an attorney must
respect the rules of the court. Thus, an attorney may not disregard, or
advise a client to disregard, a rule of a tribunal.226 The lawyer may,
however, take whatever steps are appropriate, in good faith, to test the
validity of such a rule. This can include openly refusing to obey a rule based
on the assertion that no valid obligation exists. 227 But if the attorney
intentionally or habitually violates the rules of the court, he is subject to
disciplinary action. 228 The lawyer is also under an affirmative obligation to
reveal the identity of his client to the court, unless the identity is privileged
224. 106 S. Ct. at 1000 (Brennan, J., concurring).
225. See, e.g., State v. Turner, 217 Kan. 574, 538 P.2d 966 (1975).
226. RPC Rule 3.4(c). See, e.g., Chapman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 613 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1979).
227. See supra note 226.
228. See, e.g., In re Vetter, 104 Wn. 2d 779, 711 P.2d 284 (1985).
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or irrelevant. 229 Further, a lawyer may not advise or cause a prospective
witness to secrete himself or leave the jurisdiction to avoid serving as a
witness. This rule is an extension of the lawyer's affirmative obligation not
to suppress evidence that he or his client is legally obligated to produce. 230
Nor may the attorney fail to make "reasonably diligent effort" to comply
with a legally proper discovery request.231
A lawyer should not participate in any way in the payment of compensa-
tion to a witness contingent upon the content of the witness' testimony or
the outcome of the litigation. 232 Payment to witnesses may only be based on
reasonable expenses incurred in testifying, reasonable compensation for
lost time, and a reasonable professional fee for the services of an expert
witness. 233
229. See generally R. ARONSON, supra note 85, at V-7 to V-8.
230. See RPC Rule 3.4(a). See State v. Wright, 87 Wn. 2d 783, 557 P.2d 1 (1976) (destruction of
evidence improper where there was a "reasonable possibility" that it was material to innocence of the
accused).
231. RPC Rule 3.4(d). The Rule also prohibits the making of frivolous discovery requests.
Increasing judicial concern over discovery abuse has been evident on a number of fronts. In Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 757 n.4 (1980) (footnote omitted), the Supreme Court stated:
Due to sloth, inattention, or desire to seize tactical advantage, lawyers have long indulged in
dilatory practices. A number of factors legitimately may lengthen a lawsuit, and the parties
themselves may cause some of the delays. Nevertheless, many actions are extended unnecessarily
by lawyers who exploit or abuse judicial procedures, especially the liberal rules for pretrial
discovery.
Thus, where there is repeated defiance of court orders, dismissal of the entire cause of action may be an
appropriate remedy. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639,640 (1976)
(per curiam) (refusal for 17 months to answer "crucial" interrogatories); Chira v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 634 F.2d 664, 666 (2d Cir. 1980) (doing "absolutely nothing at all" to comply with discovery
orders or move the case to trial); Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp.,
602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979) (refusal for three years, without moving for protective order, to comply
with specific orders to answer interrogatories on damages). See also Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Tel.
& Tel., 700 F.2d 785 (2d. Cir. 1983) (dismissal denied for engaging in a "pattern of intentional
concealment of evidence;" however, denial of all costs and attorneys' fees (over $10 million) to which
plaintiff would otherwise be entitled), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
In assessing fees and costs, the federal courts can also use the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1985),
which provides that:
[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States. . . who
so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the
court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct.
See also supra note 231 (frivolous pleadings). See generally Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil
Discovery: A Critique and Proposal for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295 (1978).
232. See RPC Rule 3.4(b); Model Rule 3.4 comment.
233. Model Rule 3.4 comment states that:
[wlith regard to paragraph (b), it is not improper to pay a witness's expenses or to compensate an
expert witness on terms permitted by law. The common law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is
improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying and that it is improper to pay an expert
witness a contingent fee.
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A lawyer may not refer to inadmissible evidence at trial, nor to any
matter which she has no reasonable basis to believe will be relevant to the
case or supported by admissible evidence.234 For example, suppose at-
torney X represents A in a personal injury case in which A fell down some
stairs that were under the control and ownership of B. In her opening
statement, X states that she will introduce evidence that B knew the stairs
were in dangerous condition, and that he fixed the stairs right after A's
accident. It is improper forX to refer to B's repair of the stairs, because such
evidence is inadmissible.2 35 Similarly, unless X has other evidence to
introduce showing that B knew of the dangerous condition, her entire
reference in this context is also improper.
A lawyer may not state a personal opinion with respect to the justness of a
cause, a witness' credibility, a civil litigant's culpability, or an accused's
guilt or innocence.236 An attorney may, however, make an argument upon a
logical analysis of the evidence with respect to the foregoing matters. For
example, in a final argument, a lawyer may not say to the jury, "After
listening to the testimony, I don't believe the defendant and there is no
reason why you should either." He may, however, examine the conflicts in
the testimony and the fact that the defendant has a criminal record, and state
that the evidence casts serious doubt on whether the defendant was telling
the truth. Finally, it is improper for an attorney to pose questions to a
witness which he has no reasonable basis to believe are relevant and which
are intended to degrade a witness or other person. 237
Rule 3.5 Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal
Due to a concern for the integrity of legal proceedings and the impor-
tance of the appearance of fairness to our legal system, the RPC forbid
improper contact with jurors and the courts, whether before a judicial or
administrative tribunal.238 Thus, the lawyer connected with a trial may not
234. RPC Rule 3.4(e). See, e.g., Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108,124, 116 Cal. Rptr.
713, 723 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975) (among other things, stating to the jury that his
client "was stripped of his presumption of innocence by the press with the help of the Sheriff's Office").
235. See WASH. R. EvD. 407. In the example, since B has admitted ownership and control,
admissibility could not be premised on the exception in WASH. R. EvID. 407.
236. RPC Rule 3.4(f). See also State v. Reed, 102 Wn. 2d 140,684 P.2d 699 (1984); State v. Monk,
42Wn. App. 320,324-25,711 P.2d 365,367-68 (1985); State v. Martin, 41 Wn. App. 133,139-40,703
P.2d 309, 312-13 (1985).
237. See generally Rules 3.4(e) and 4.4. See, e.g., Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108,
116 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1974) (stating that a witness was a thief, doing a year injail, without adequate basis
for impeachment), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
238. See Model Rule 3.5 comment: "Many forms of improper influence upon a tribunal are
proscribed by criminal law. Others are specified in the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, with
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communicate with anyone known to be a member of the jury venire unless
the communication is in the course of official proceedings. 239 Similarly, a
lawyer may not conduct or cause another person to conduct a vexatious or
harassing investigation of a venireman or an ultimate juror.240 Except
within the course of official proceedings, an attorney, whether or not
connected with the case, shall not communicate directly or indirectly with a
juror concerning the case. 241 A lawyer is, however, permitted to discuss a
verdict with the jury after the trial, so that she may have the opportunity to
determine if the verdict is subject to legal challenge. But the attorney, in
conducting such discussions, is not permitted to ask questions calculated to
harass or embarrass ajuror or influence his actions in future jury service. 242
For example, if attorney X, in his discussions with juror A, discovers that
juror B might have committed an impropriety that would be grounds for a
new trial, X may question other members of the jury to determine the extent
of B's impropriety, but should avoid questioning B directly, as such
questions may harass B or influence his actions in future jury service.
A lawyer may not communicate with a judge or official about the merits
of a pending case except in the direct course of official proceedings, when
permitted by law, or when she notifies the opposing party of her intention to
make a presentation to the judge or official. 243 Nor may the lawyer engage
in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal. 244
which an advocate should be familiar. A lawyer is required to avoid contributing to a violation of such
provisions." Washington adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC), effective January 1, 1974. CJC
Canon 3(A)(4) provides that ajudge, "except as authorized bylaw, [should] neither initiate nor consider
ex parte or other communicatons concerning a pending or impending proceeding."
239. See RPC Rule 3.5(a).
240. See RPC Rule 4.4.
241. RPC Rule 3.5(b). See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Peterson, 418 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1982).
242. See RPC Rule 4.4.
243. See RPC Rule 3.5(b) and CJC Canon 3(A)(4) (although ex parte communications are
proscribed, the judge "may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a
proceeding before him, by amicus curiae only, if he affords the parties reasonable opportunity to
respond"). See also People v. Hertz, 638 P.2d 794 (Colo. 1982); In re Moody, 428 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind.
1981); In re Bell, 294 Or. 202, 655 P.2d 569 (1982).
244. RPC Rule 3.5(c). Model Rule 3.5 comment provides:
The advocate's function is to present evidence and argument so that the cause may be decided
according to law. Refraining from abusive or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's
right to speak on behalf of litigants. A lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge but should
avoid reciprocation; the judge's default is no justification for similar dereliction by an advocate. An
advocate can present the cause, protect the record for subsequent review and preserve professional
integrity by patient firmness no less effectively than by belligerence or theatrics.
See State v. Reed, 102 Wn. 2d 140, 684 P.2d 699 (1984). See also Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App.
3d 108, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713, 724 (1974) (behavior referred to by the court as a "[d]isplay of offensive
personality"), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975). See generally Aronson, supra note 36, at 292-93
(discussing United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972); In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir.
1972), and related authorities).
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Rule 3.6 Trial Publicity
In order to maintain the dignity of the profession and insure against
prejudicial publicity, the RPC provide restraints on public statements by
lawyers on either side with regard to the matter at issue in a civil or criminal
trial. RPC Rule 3.6 has been formulated with the intention of striking a
balance between "protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the
right of free expression. ' 245 Thus, a lawyer in either a criminal or civil
setting may not participate in any prohibited extrajudicial statement if a
reasonable person would expect that such a statement would be dissemi-
nated by the public communications media and the lawyer "knows" or
"reasonably should know" 246 that it will have a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.247
A lawyer may not make any prejudical statements with respect to a civil
matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding which
could lead to incarceration. 248 Statements considered prejudicial include:
references to a party's (or criminal suspect's) character, reputation, or prior
criminal record;249 the possibility of a guilty plea or the existence of a
confession, admission, or statement by the accused, or his failure to give
the same;250 the performance or result of a test or examination; 251 the
identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective witness; 252 an opinion as
to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the evidence, or the merits of the
case against the accused;253 or information which the lawyer "knows or
reasonably should know" 254 would be inadmissible at trial and would
create a substantial risk of prejudicing a fair trial. 255
245. Model Rule 3.6 comment. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
246. This is an objective standard, denoting "that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence
would ascertain the matter in question." RPC, Terminology section. See State v. Wixon, 30 Wn. App.
63,631 P.2d 1033 (1981); Louisiana State BarAss'n v. Karst, 428 So. 2d 406, 409 (La. 1983) ("where it
is shown that an attorney knew, or in good faith should have known, of the falsity of his accusations, that
attorney's unsubstantiated, subjective belief in the truth of those accusations, however genuine, will not
excuse his violation"); In re Hinds, 90 N.L 604, 449 A.2d 483 (1982).
247. RPC Rule 3.6(a). See State v. Bonner, 21 Wn. App. 783, 587 P.2d 580 (1978).
248. RPC Rule 3.6(b). See Levine v. United States Dist. Ct., 764 F2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985).
249. RPC Rule 3.6(b)(1). See Levine, 764 F.2d at 599.
250. RPC Rule 3.6(b)(2). See Wixon, 30 Wn. App. at 69, 631 P.2d at 1038 (1981).
251. RPC Rule 3.6(b)(3). The Rule also prohibits statements relating to "the refusal or failure of a
person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be
presented." See Levine, 764 F.2d at 599.
252. RPC Rule 3.6(b)(1).
253. See RPC Rule 3.6(b)(3), (4). See, e.g., State v. Bonner, 21 Wn. App. 783,791,587 P.2d 580,
585 (1978).
254. See supra note 56.
255. RPC Rule 3.6(b)(5). In addition, RPC Rule 3.6(b)(6) prohibits statements relating to "the fact
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Statements that are permissible include: any information in the public
record;256 the fact that an investigation is in progress and the general scope
of the investigation, including the description of the offense; 257 and the
identity of the persons involved, such as the victim in a criminal case, but
only to the extent permitted by law. 258 In addition, a lawyer may issue a
request for assistance in obtaining evidence or apprehending a suspect, 259
or a warning if there is reason to believe that a person involved constitutes a
danger to the public. 260 In a criminal case, a lawyer may announce basic
facts such as the name, age, residence, occupation, and family status of the
accused, the identity of the victim (if authorized by law), the nature of the
charge, the scheduling of any step in the judicial proceedings, and that the
accused denies the charges made against her. 261
The RPC require that, in addition to avoiding improper public com-
ments, the lawyer must exercise reasonable care to prevent employees and
associates from making extrajudicial statements that the attorney is pre-
cluded from making. 262 For example, suppose that police officers com-
monly disclose to the press information falling under the above prohibi-
tions. Unless the prosecutor takes reasonable measures to prevent such
disclosures, he will violate RPC Rules 3.6 and 3.8.263
Rule 3.7 Lawyer as Witness
A lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate at trial where the lawyer or a
firm member is likely to be a necessary 264 witness. 265 In such a situation,
that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining
that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless
proven guilty." See also Levine, 764 F.2d at 599.
256. RPC Rule 3.6(c)(2). But see Wixon, 30 Wn. App. at 69-70, 631 P.2d at 1038 (mere fact that
defendant's statements are in public record does not take into account possible prejudicial effect of
prosecutor's publication of statement).
257. In a civil case, an attorney may state "the general nature of the claim or defense." RPC Rule
3.6(c)(1).
258. RPC Rule 3.6(c)(3).
259. See RPC Rule 3.6(c)(5); 3.6(c)(7)(ii).
260. See RPC Rule 3.6(c)(6) (statement permissible if "there exists the likelihood of substantial
harm to an individual or to the public interest").
261. See RPC Rule 3.6(c)(1), (3), (4) & (7)(i).
262. See RPC Rule 5.3; RPC Rule 3.8(e) (prosecutors); Model Rule 5.3 comment.
263. This result assumes that, in the terms of RPC Rule 5.3(b), the prosecutor has "direct
supervisory authority over" the police officers. RPC Rule 3.8(e) would clearly apply, since police
officers are "law enforcement personnel."
264. It has been held that the attorney's testimony must be genuinely needed, not just helpful. J.P.
Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1359 (2d Cir. 1975); Connell v. Clairol, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 17,
18 n. I (N.D. Ga. 1977). And, in Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 393 N.E.2d 847, 857 (1979), the
court stated that (1) if it is counsel's and his client's best judgment that they can get by without testimony
from counsel, then it is not up to the other party to urge upon them a different plan of presentation that
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the attorney should refuse employment or, if he has already been retained,
he should withdraw from the case.266 Clearly, if there is a question as to
whether he will be called as a witness, all doubts should be resolved in favor
of withdrawing from the case. Exceptions to this rule include instances
where "[t]he testimony relates to an issue that is either uncontested or a
formality. 2 6 7 In a proceeding concerning an uncontested will, for exam-
ple, an attorney may testify as to the testamentary capacity of the decedent.
Another exception is where "[t]he testimony relates to the nature and value
of legal services rendered in the case." 268 If a client's suit against another
includes a legitimate cause of action for attorney's fees, the attorney may
testify to the value of the services rendered to the client.
Another exception is permitted where the lawyer has been called by the
opposing party and the court rules that the lawyer may continue to act as an
advocate.269 Generally, if opposing counsel legitimately calls the attorney
to give testimony prejudicial to her client, it would be improper to remain
as counsel in the case. The rule gives the trial court discretion to allow the
attorney to continue.270
Finally, the lawyer may act as a witness where the trial judge finds that
disqualification would work a substantial hardship on the client and the
would necessitate disqualification, and (2) only when a present intention to forego the testimony of
counsel appears obviously contrary to the client's interests should the judge reject counsel's best
judgment in the matter and order disqualification. But see Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. American
Consumer Indus., 441 F Supp. 1064, 1068 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
265. RPC Rule 3.7. As stated in Model Rule 3.7 comment:
Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the opposing party and can involve a
conflict of interest between the lawyer and client.
The opposing party has proper objection where the combinatiofh of roles may prejudice that
party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge,
while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be
clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the
proof.
266. See RPC Rule 1.15(a)(1).
267. RPC Rule 3.7(a).
268. RPC Rule 3.7(b). "[W]here the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services
rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyers to testify avoids the need
for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue." Model Rule 3.7 comment.
269. RPC Rule 3.7(c).
270. The cases indicate judicial reluctance to disqualify when a party indicates an intention to call
the opposing party's lawyer as a witness. The possibilities for abuse are substantial. See, e.g.,
Kroungold v. Triester, 521 F.2d 763, 766 (3d Cir. 1975) (citing a statement by the drafters of CPR DR
5-102(B) that the rule was not intended to permit a lawyer to call opposing counsel as a witness and
thereby disqualify such counsel); Freeman v. Kulicke & Soffa Indus., 449 F. Supp. 974, 977-78 (E.D.
Pa.), aff'd without opinion, 591 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that, in order to be deemed
"prejudicial," the projected testimony cannot be "de minimis," but must be so adverse to the factual
assertions offered on behalf of the client that the bar or the client might have an interest in the
independence of the witness or his partner in discrediting that testimony); Graphic Process Co. v.
Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 43, 156 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1979) (overturning trial court's order granting
disqualification as an abuse of discretion).
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likelihood of the lawyer being a necessary witness was not reasonably
foreseeable before trial. 271 Suppose that attorney X represents B in a highly
complex case which is in the middle of trial. X's testimony becomes highly
relevant to the case at this point, but he cannot withdraw from the case
because B would not be able to secure adequate replacement representation
on such short notice. If a continuance is not possible, X should be permitted
to testify and to continue to represent B.
Rule 3.8 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
Public prosecutors and similarly situated government attorneys have a re-
sponsibility to the public as well as the legal profession in exercising their
prosecutorial functions. Their obligation is to seek justice, not merely to ob-
tain a conviction or a favorablejudgment. 272 Several areas of the prosecutor's
special responsibilities are addressed in RPC Rule 3.8.273 The public
271. RPC Rule 3.7(d). See Model Rule 3.7 comment, stating that the Rule:
recognizes that a balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the opposing
party. Whether the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case,
the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's
testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in
determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified due regard must be given to the effect of
disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably
foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness.
See Harris v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 3d 488, 158 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1979). In Harris, plaintiffs had
previously obtained a judgment against a negligent driver unable to respond fully in damages, and then
claimed damages from their own medical insurers for bad faith breach of contract. Defendants' insurers
moved to disqualify plaintiffs' attorney on the ground that he would be called to testify about the
negotiations with defendants, matters critical to plaintiffs' bad faith claim, and also about emotional
distress that he had witnessed, pertinent to the punitive damages claim. The court held that, despite this
potential dual role as witness and adversary, the attorney's continued representation was required to
avoid great hardship to plaintiffs and, therefore, the trial court's disqualification order was an abuse of
discretion. See also Lyle v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 470, 175 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1981).
272. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Formal Op. No. 150 (1936).
The public prosecutor cannot take as a guide for the conduct of his office the standards of an
attorney appearing on behalf of an individual client. The freedom elsewhere wisely granted to
partisan advocacy must be severely curtailed if the prosecutor's duties are to be properly
discharged. The public prosecutor must recall that he occupies a dual role, being obligated, on the
one hand, to furnish that adversary element essential to the informed decision of any controversy,
but being possessed, on the other, of important governmental powers that are pledged to the
accomplishment of one objective only, that of impartial justice. Where the prosecutor is recreant to
the trust implicit in his office, he undermines confidence, not only in his profession, but in
government and the very ideal of justice itself.
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1218 (1958).
273. In addition to the ethical responsibilities specifically delineated in the Rule, the prosecutor is
obligated to adhere to all other provisions of the RPC and to conform her conduct to the dictates of
justice. For an extreme example of prosecutorial misconduct at trial, resulting in the dismissal of the
entire prosecution, see United States v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 389, appeal dismissed, 513 F.2d 1329 (8th
Cir. 1975). See also State v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wn. 2d 579, 564 P.2d 799 (1977) (prosecutor attempted to
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prosecutor must refrain from bringing charges which she knows are not sup-
ported by probable cause,274 and must make reasonable efforts to ensure that
the right of the accused to have and obtain counsel has been afforded. 275 This
duty also includes ensuring that the accused does not waive important pre-
trial rights because of a lack of understanding due to the fact that he is not
represented. 276 Once charges are brought, the prosecutor must make timely
disclosure to the defense of all evidence of an exculpatory nature or evidence
that would tend to reduce the punishment (for example, at sentencing). 277
Rule 3.9 Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings
A lawyer who is representing a client before a legislative or admin-
istrative tribunal in a nonadjudicative proceeding must disclose the fact that
he is appearing in a representative capacity and fulfill his duties of fairness
and candor and should not engage in ex parte contacts. 278
TITLE IV. TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN
CLIENTS
Rule 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others
A lawyer generally does not have a duty to inform opposing parties of
relevant facts that are unknown to them. 279 However, a lawyer may not
withdraw from plea agreement); State v. Case, 49 Wn. 2d 66, 298 P.2d 500 (1956) (misconduct during
closing argument); State v. Socolofsky, 283 Kan. 1020, 666 P.2d 725 (1983) (following defendant's
acquittal, prosecutor sent, anonymously, copy of newspaper article reporting that defendant had
pleaded guilty to another charge of selling LSD, to each of the jurors).
274. RPC Rule 3.8(a). See generally ABA STANDARDS RELATING To THE ADMNSTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JusTIcE, THE PROSECtrrON FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.4 (1974).
275. See RPC Rule 3.8(b).
276. See RPC Rule 3.8(c). The Rule does not "forbid the lawful questioning of a suspect who has
knowingly waived the rights to counsel and silence." Model Rule 3.8 comment.
277. See RPC Rule 3.8(d). In addition to the ethical requirements, the Supreme Court has held that
"the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). See United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976) ("there are situations in which evidence is obviously of such substantial
value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even without a specific
request"). Under FED. R. Cium. P. 16(c), both prosecutors and defense counsel are under a continuing
duty to disclose:
If, prior to or during trial, a party discovers additional evidence or material previously requested
or ordered, which is subject to discovery or inspection under this rule, he shall promptly notify the
other party or his attorney or the court of the existence of the additional evidence or material.
See also United States v. Bailleaux, 685 E2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1982).
278. RPC Rule 3.9 (citing RPC Rules 3.3(a)-(e), 3.4(a)-(c), & 3.5).
279. Model Rule 4.1 comment. However, "[a] misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer
incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations
875
Washington Law Review Vol. 61:823, 1986
knowingly "[m]ake a false statement of material fact 280 or law to a third
person," 281 or fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary
to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client (unless disclosure
is prohibited under RPC Rule 1.6).282
can also occur by failure to act." Id. With respect to ethical issues in negotiation by lawers, see White,
Machiavelli and the Bar: EthicalLimitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH
J. 926; Rubin,A CauserieonLawyers' Ethics inNegotiation, 35 LA. L. REv. 577 (1975). Important recent
works on negotiation goals, styles, and techniques include: R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES (1981);
G. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETLEMENT (1983); Menkel-Meadow, TowardAnother View of
Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754 (1984).
280. Model Rule 4.1 comment states:
Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances.
Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not
taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a
transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category,
and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal
would constitute fraud.
281. RPC Rule 4. l(a). Neither may the lawyer provide false statements for the client's use in a
transaction with a third person. See, e.g., SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v.
Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964). Although knowledge of falsity is
a prerequisite for imposing penalties generally, see Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), such
knowledge may be shown by proof that the lawyer "deliberately closed his eyes to facts he had a duty to
see, . . . or recklessly stated as facts things of which he was ignorant." Benjamin, 328 F.2d at 862
(footnotes omitted).
282. RPC Rule 4.1(b). As stated in Model Rule 4.1 comment, this section "recognizes that
subtantive law may require a lawyer to disclose certain information to avoid being deemed to have
assisted the client's crime or fraud." See, e.g., Felts v. National Account Sys. Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54
(N.D. Miss. 1978); Gross, Attorneys and Their Corporate Clients: SEC Rule 2(e) and the Georgetown
Whistle-Blowing Proposal, 3 CORP. L. REv. 197,208-13 (1980). In In re Carter and Johnson, FED. SEC.
LAW REP.(CCH) § 82,847 (S.E.C., Feb. 28, 1981), the Commission stated with respect to SEC Rule
2(e)(1)(ii) (1970) (permitting Commission to deny privilege of practicing before it to any attorney found
"to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct"):
When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation of a company's compliance with
the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws becomes aware that his client is engaged
in a substantial and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure requirements, his continued
participation violates professional standards unless he takes prompt steps to end the client's
noncompliance.
Id. at p. 84,172. However, the attorney should take action internal to the company or resign, rather than
disclose the client's violations or intended violations to third persons. Id. at p. 84,173 n.78. See also
SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (withdrawal may serve to
prevent consummation of an illegal or fraudulent transaction by terminating the lawyer's participation
and assistance).
In addition, it is improper to provide a legal opinion on a transaction that discloses only favorable
facts when the lawyer knowingly omits material facts likely to affect another's decision in the matter.
See, e.g., Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901
(1976); In re Malloy, 248 N.W.2d 43 (N.D. 1976).
Finally, an attorney may have a duty to disclose information necessary to protect unknowing potential
victims from death or serious bodily injury at the hands of his client. Hawkins v. King County, 24 Wn.
App. 338, 602 P.2d 361 (1979). See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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Rule 4.2 Communication with Person Represented by Counsel
When dealing with a person who is represented by counsel, a lawyer may
not communicate directly with the person about the subject matter of the
representation unless she has opposing counsel's permission or is permitted
to do so by law.283 The purpose of this rule is to ensure that every party is
fairly represented and that no undue influence is exerted by counsel.284 In
Wright v. Group Health Hospital,285 in connection with events leading to a
medical malpractice action, a defendant hospital corporation prohibited its
current employees from conducting ex parte interviews with plaintiffs'
attorneys. The court held the prohibition was impermissible. Where the
adverse party is a corporation or other organizational entity, an attorney
should not undertake, without consent of counsel, communication with
high level managerial employees and agents who speak for the organiza-
tion; but other employees who may have been witnesses to relevant occur-
rences and transactions may usually be interviewed without prior permis-
sion of counsel for the organization. "[T]he best interpretation of 'party' in
litigation involving corporations is only those employees who have the
legal authority to 'bind' the corporation in a legal evidentiary sense, i.e.,
those employees who have 'speaking authority' for the corporation. '286
Rule 4.3 Dealing with Unrepresented Person
Whenever a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that an unrepre-
sented third person believes the lawyer to be disinterested, the lawyer
283. RPC Rule 4.2. See also Crane v. State Bar, 30 Cal. 3d 117, 177 Cal. Rptr. 670, 635 P.2d 163
(1981). Model Rule 4.2 comment adds:
This Rule does not prohibit communication with i party, or an employee or agent of a party,
concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy
between a government agency and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit
a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a
separate matter. Also, parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other and a lawyer
having independent justification for communicating with the other party is permitted to do so.
Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of a party to a controversy with
a government agency to speak with government officials about the matter.
Prosecutors are bound by the Rule and generally may not interview a represented defendant, either at
the defendant's own request, see, e.g., People v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448 (Mich. 1979), or in connection
with the investigation of another crime, e.g., State v. Yatman, 320 So. 2d 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975),
without first notifying defense counsel, thereby providing an opportunity for consultation.
284. See Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 103 Wn. 2d 192, 691 P.2d 564 (1984).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 200, 691 P.2d at 569.
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should make reasonable efforts to explain his role as counsel to his client,
and that he has a duty to promote the best interests of his client.287
Rule 4.4 Respect for Rights of Third Person.
In maintaining respect for the rights of third persons, a lawyer may not
use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay,
burden, or injure a third person, or obtain evidence by means that are
violative of such person's legal rights.2 88
TITLE V. LAW FIRMS AND ASSOCIATIONS
Rule 5.1 Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer
Any lawyer who has supervisory authority over other attorneys, for
example, a partner in a law firm or a supervising attorney in a government
agency, must reasonably ensure that the lawyers under her authority con-
form to the RPC.289 A lawyer is responsible for another lawyer's violation
of the RPC if: "[t]he lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific
conduct, ratifies the specific conduct involved; ' 290 or "[t]he lawyer is a
partner in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct
supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a
time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take
reasonable remedial action." 291
287. See RPC Rule 4.3; Model Rule 4.3 comment:
An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might
assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when
the lawyer represents a client. During the course of a lawyer's representation of a client, the lawyer
should not give advice to an unrepresented person other than the advice to obtain counsel.
288. RPC Rule 4.4. See, e.g., Smith v. Union Pac. R.R., 214 Kan. 128, 519 P.2d 1101 (1974)
(harassing jurors); Olberg v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 291 Minn. 334, 191 N.W.2d 418 (1971) (harassing
jurors).
289. See RPC Rule 5.1(a), (b). See also, e.g., In re Schroeter, 80 Wn. 2d 1, 489 P.2d 917 (1971);
Vaughn v. State Bar, 6 Cal. 3d 847,494 P.2d 1257, 100 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1972); Model Rule 5.1 comment
provides:
The measures required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) can
depend on the firm's structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm, informal supervision
and occasional admonition ordinarily might be sufficient. In a large firm, or in practice situations
in which intensely difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate procedures may be
necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make con-
fidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee.
See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in
professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all
its members and a lawyer having authority over the work of another may not assume that the
subordinate lawyer will inevitably conform to the Rules.
290. RPC Rule 5.1(c)(1) (emphasis added). See also RPC Rule 8.4(a).
291. RPC Rule 5.1(c)(2). As stated in Model Rule 5.1 comment:
Whether a lawyer has such supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact.
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Rule 5.2 Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer'
A lawyer must always abide by the RPC. He cannot justify a violation of
the Rules by saying: "I was only following orders. " 29 2 However, where an
attorney has been asked to handle a particular matter by a supervisor,
whose resolution of an "arguable question of professional duty" is reason-
able, the attorney may follow the supervisor's instructions without fear of
ethical violation, even if the supervisor's resolution is subsequently deter-
mined to be improper under the RPC.293
Rule 5.3 Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants
Any lawyer who has supervisory authority over nonlawyer assistants
must reasonably act to ensure that their conduct is compatible with the
professional obligations of the lawyer.294 A lawyer is responsible for the
Partners of a private firm have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm,
while a partner in charge of a particular matter ordinarily has direct authority over other firm
lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner would depend on the
immediacy of the partner's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. The supervisor is
required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that
the misconduct occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a
matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to
correct the resulting misapprehension.
It should be noted that if the firm did not have in effect "measures giving reasonable assurance that all
lawyers in the firm conform to" the RPC, the supervisory lawyer would be in violation of RPC Rule
5.1(b), even though there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of the violation. Model Rule 5.1
comment. "Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a
question of law beyond the scope of these Rules." Id. See also In re Gladstone, 16 A.D.2d 512, 229
N.Y.S.2d 663 (1962) (attorney continued in practice as a partner when he should have known of the
fraudulent practices of the firm); In re Brown, 389 Ill. 516, 59 N.E.2d 855 (1945) (lawyer at least
suspected that partner's activities were not confined to lawful practice).
292. See RPC Rule 5.2(a). The lawyer's subordinate role may be relevant in determining whether
he had the knowledge required to render conduct a violation under the RPC. Model Rule 5.2 comment.
"For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the subordinate
would not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous
character." Id. For an in-depth analysis of the subordinate lawyer's ethical responsibilities and the
justifications for disobeying the supervisor, see Levinson, To a Young Lawyer: Thoughts on Disobe-
dience, 50 Mo. L. Rav. 483 (1985).
293. See RPC Rule 5.2(b). "For example, if a question arises whether the interests of two clients
conflict under Rule 1.7, the supervisor's reasonable resolution of the question should protect the
subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged." Model Rule 5.2 comment.
294. RPC Rule 5.3(a), (b). All lawyers with direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer must
make reasonable efforts to ensure compliance with the RPC, RPC Rule 5.3(b), whereas firm partners
must also "make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable
assurance that the person's conduct" complies with the RPC. RPC Rule 5.3(a).
Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law
student interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent con-
tractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer should give
such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their
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actions of nonlegal personnel if: the conduct of such persons would be in
violation of the RPC if engaged in by the lawyer and "[t]he lawyer orders
or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct in-
volved; 295 or the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the individu-
als are employed, or has direct supervisory authority over them, and knows
of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated,
but fails to take reasonable remedial action. 296
Rule 5.4 Professional Independence of a Lawyer.
As a general rule, a lawyer or law firm may not share legal fees with a
nonlawyer. 297 This includes payment in any form, gifts or loans, in return
for the referral of a case or client. 298 There are three exceptions. First, a firm
may pay death benefits, for a reasonable period of time, to a lawyer's estate
employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to represen-
tation of the client, and should be responsible for their work product.
Model Rule 5.3 comment. Under ADMISSION TO PRACTICE RULES (APR), Rule 9, "[q]ualified law
students, enrolled law clerks, and graduates of approved law schools may be admitted to the status of
legal intern and be granted a limited license to engage in the practice of law" if, among other
requirements, they obtain a "supervising lawyer" to assume the responsibilities required under APR
9(d):
(I) The supervising lawyer or another lawyer from the same office shall direct, supervise and
review all of the work of the legal intern and both shall assume personal professional responsibility
for any work undertaken by the legal intern while under the lawyer's supervision ...
(5) The failure of a supervising lawyer, or lawyer acting as a supervising lawyer, to provide
adequate supervision or to comply with the duties set forth in this rule shall be grounds for
disciplinary action pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Discipline.
(6) For purposes of the attorney-client privilege, an intern shall be considered a subordinate of
the lawyer providing supervision for the intern.
In City of Seattle v. Ratliff, 100 Wn. 2d 212,667 P.2d 630 (1983), the Washington Supreme Court held
that "representation by a law student pursuant to rule 9 does not deny a defendant his or her right to
counsel as long as the student strictly complies with rule 9 requirements." Id. at 213, 667 P.2d at 631.
After noting that the supervising attorney must assume professional responsibility for the legal intern's
work, the court stated that "representation by a rule 9 intern under the active supervision of a licensed
attorney will most likely result in a higher caliber representation than than provided by a novice attorney
sitting alone. There is no constitutional infirmity in such representation." Id. at 218, 667 P.2d at 633.
See also People v. Perez, 24 Cal. 3d 133, 594 P.2d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1979).
295. RPC Rule 5.3(c)(1).
296. RPC Rule 5.3(c)(2).
297. RPC Rule 5.4(a).
298. RPC Rule 5.4 poses significant difficulties for attorneys interested in becoming part of
prepaid legal sevices plans operated by insurance companies. See Schwartz & Archer, Prepaid Grows
Up, LEGAL ECONOMICS 32, 38 (July/August 1983). In the Proposed Final Draft of the Model RPC (May
30, 1981), Rule 5.4 permitted a lawyer to "be employed by an organization in which a financial interest
is held or managerial authority is exercised by a nonlawyer, . . such as [an] insurance company," so
long as the professional independence of the lawyer was safeguarded. However, this proposal was
defeated by the House of Delegates in favor of the adopted version of Rule 5.4, despite warnings that it
would negatively impact on prepaid legal services programs. Midyear Meeting ofABA, 51 U.S.L.W.
2488, 2493 (Feb. 22, 1983).
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or beneficiary. 299 Second, a lawyer who completes unfinished legal busi-
ness of a deceased lawyer may pay the deceased's estate compensation for
the reasonable value of the services rendered by the deceased lawyer.300
Finally, a lawyer or a firm may include nonlawyer employees in a profit-
sharing compensation or retirement plan.301
A lawyer may not enter into a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the
partnership activities constitute the practice of law.302 Further, a lawyer
who is recommended or employed or whose fee is paid by a third party may
not allow the third party to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional
judgment concerning the representation of the client.30 3
A lawyer may not participate in a professional corporation or association
authorized to practice law for profit if: (1)"[a] nonlawyer owns any interest
therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may
hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during
administration; ' '304 (2)"[a] nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer
(other than as secretary or treasurer);" 30 5 or (3) "[a] nonlawyer has the right
to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer. 30 6
Rule 5.5 Unauthorized Practice of Law
A lawyer is subject to the licensing regulations of any jurisdiction in
which he intends to practice. 307 In most jurisdictions, the lawyer must
either be admitted to practice 30 8 or permitted to appear pro hac vice.
Although the procedures for pro hac vice appearances differ among juris-
dictions, all require that the attorney at least be admitted in some state.309
Because an out-of-state attorney's interest in appearing pro hac vice is not
among those interests protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
299. See RPC 5.4(a)(1).
300. RPC 5.4(a)(2).
301. RPC Rule 5.4(a)(3).
302. RPC Rule 5.4(b).
303. RPC Rule 5.4(c).
304. RPC Rule 5.4(d)(1).
305. RPC Rule 5.4(d)(2).
306. RPC Rule 5.4(d)(3).
307. See RPC Rule 5.5(a).
308. See RPC Rule 8.1 for requirements for admission.
309. See, e.g., APR 8(b):
A member in good standing of the Bar of any other state or territory of the United States or of the
District of Columbia, who is a resident of and maintains a practice in such other state, territory, or
District, may appear as a lawyer in the trial of any action or proceeding only (i) with the permission
of the court or tribunal in which the action or proceeding is pending, and (ii) in association with an
active member of the Bar Association, who shall be the lawyer of record therein, responsible for
the conduct thereof, and present at all proceedings.
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amendment, his application for permission to so appear may be denied
without a hearing or other procedural due process. 310
In addition to regulating the admission of lawyers, every jurisdiction has
sought to prevent the unauthorized practice of law.311 Criminal (usually
misdemeanor) sanctions may be imposed on the nonlawyers, and lawyers
may not assist a person who is not a member of the Bar with respect to
conduct constituting the unauthorized practice of law.312 This prohibition is
predicated upon the public's need for integrity and competence of those
persons purporting to render "legal" services. However, it is not un-
authorized practice for a layperson to represent himself.313 The simple
sharing of office space by a lawyer and nonlawyer is permissible only if the
offices are physically separate in fact and appear so in the public eye. 314
Further, precautions must be taken so that the nonlawyer's clients are not
influenced to consult with the attorney sharing the offices when they are in
need of legal advice.
The RPC do not attempt to set forth a single definition of those activities
which constitute the unauthorized practice of law. 315 However, the former
310. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
311. See generally Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly; A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1981); Weckstein, Limitations on
the Right to Counsel: The Unauthorized Practice of Law, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 649.
312. RPC Rule 5.5(b). According to Model Rule 5.5 comment:
Paragraph (b) does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paraprofessionals and
delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains
responsibility for their work. See Rule 5.3. Likewise, it does not prohibit lawyers from providing
professional advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of law;
for example, claims adjusters, employees of financial or commercial institutions, social workers,
accountants and persons employed in government agencies. In addition, a lawyer may counsel
nonlawyers who wish to proceed pro se.
313. Thus, Washington has recognized an exception to any prohibition against the unauthorized
practice of law:
when a party to a legal document selects, prepares or drafts the document or represents himself in
court proceedings. Both of these exceptions are based upon a
belief that a layperson may desire to act on his own behalf with respect to his legal rights and
obligations without the benefit of counsel.
The "pro se" exceptions are quite limited and apply only if the layperson is acting solely on
his own behalf.
Hagen & Van Camp v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 96 Wn. 2d 443, 450, 635 P.2d 730, 734 (1981) (quoting
Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Great W. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 91 Wn. 2d 48, 57, 586 P.2d
870, 876 (1978)). A developing area of unauthorized practice and the "pro se" exception consists of
selling "kits" to consumers whereby the consumer can then appear pro se. The most prevalent is a
"divorce kit" which can be purchased containing sample papers which the consumer can fill out and file
with the court in a pro se appearance for dissolution of marriage. Compare Florida Bar v. Peake, 364 So.
2d 431 (Fla. 1978) (unauthorized practice), with In re Thompson, 574 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. 1978) (not
unauthorized practice). See generally Special Project, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se
Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104 (1976).
314. See, e.g., Wash. State Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm. Ops. 30, 31 (June 1954).
315. See Model Rule 5.5 comment: "The definition of the practice of law is established by law and
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CPR and cases interpreting it employed a functional definition, referring to
the practice of law as it "relates to the rendition of services for others that
call for the professional judgment of a lawyer. ", 316 Where the professional
judgment of a lawyer is not involved, nonlawyers, such as court clerks,
abstracters, and many government officials, are authorized to engage in
occupations requiring a special knowledge of law in certain areas. 317 Some
examples of the distinctions and applications of the doctrine follow.
First, in theory, lay tax advisers may not counsel individuals as to the
legal implications of their conduct but may, if qualified (for example,
accountants), prepare tax returns for clients. If a client goes to see his tax
accountant to consult with her concerning tax shelters for his large income,
the accountant may not give advice to the client concerning tax shelters
because such advice requires the professional judgment of a lawyer as to the
legality of specific action under the tax laws.
Estate planners may not draft wills or prepare plans for specific individu-
als, but may disseminate general information to the public through com-
mercial or noncommercial means. One estate planner published a book
entitled How to Avoid Probate!, which was, in effect, a "do-it-yourself"
probate kit. He was subsequently charged with practicing law without a
license. The court held that he was not engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law.318 In effect, he was instead merely disseminating informa-
tion to the public to enable individuals to represent themselves.
Many unauthorized practice cases, particularly in Washington, have
involved the drafting or filling in the blanks of standardized real estate
documents. Thus, it has been held that the practice of law includes "selec-
tion and completion of form legal documents, or the drafting of such
documents, including deeds, mortgages, deeds of trust, promissory notes,
and agreements modifying these documents. ,319 However, the Washington
Supreme Court recently created a narrow exception to its uniform disap-
proval of all such activity by real estate agents and brokers. In Cultum v.
varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting thepractice of law to members
of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons."
316. CPR EC 3-5.
317. In State ex reL Pearson v. Gould, 437 N.E.2d 41, 42 (Ind. 1982), although the court held that
"[a] person who gives legal advice to clients and transacts business for them in matters connected with
the law is engaged in the practice of law," the court permitted nonlawyers to represent employees in
hearings before a state employment board. See also State Bar v. Galloway, 124 Mich. App. 271, 335
N.W.2d 475 (1983) aff'd, 422 Mich. 188,369 N.W.2d 839 (1985) (nonattomey may represent employer
in proceedings before Michigan Employment Security Commission).
318. New York County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1967).
319. Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn. 2d 581, 586, 675 P.2d 193, 197 (1983)
(quoting Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Great W. UnionFed. Say. &LoanAss'n, 91 Wn. 2d48, 55,586
P.2d 870 (1978)).
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Heritage House Realtors,320 the court reviewed ajudgment against a realtor
for damages stemming from an allegedly ambiguous earnest money form
prepared by the real estate agent. Although holding that completion of
standardized real estate forms probably constitutes the practice of law, the
court decided that, under certain narrow conditions, it should no longer be
considered "unauthorized:"
Our decision provides that a real estate broker or salesperson is permitted to
complete simple printed standardized real estate forms, which forms must be
approved by a lawyer, it being understood that these forms shall not be used
for other than simple real estate transactions which arise in the usual course of
the broker's business and that such forms will be used only in connection with
real estate transactions actually handled by such broker or salesperson as a
broker or salesperson and then without charge for the simple service of
completing the forms. 321
The court noted, however, that such brokers or salespersons will be held to
the same standard as attorneys for purposes of malpractice liability.322
Corporations, other than nonprofit legal service groups or recognized
professional corporations, generally may not represent a client directly in
judicial proceedings or provide representation through their attorney-em-
ployees. In addition, corporations, unlike individuals, may not represent
themselves.323
Full-time judges and court officers (including clerks) may not practice
law. 324 Under Admission to Practice Rules (APR) Rule 9, "[q]ualified law
students, enrolled law clerks, and graduates of approved law schools may
be admitted to the status of legal intern and be granted a limited license to
engage in the practice of law only as provided in this rule." Although the
legal intern may not be paid by a client for his services, he may be paid for
services by his employer-supervisor. The legal intern may advise or negoti-
ate on behalf of a person referred by the supervising lawyer, and may
prepare necessary pleadings, motions, briefs, or other documents, without
320. 103 Wn. 2d 623, 694 P.2d 630 (1985).
321. Id. at 630, 694 P.2d at 635.
322. Id. at 628, 694 P.2d at 633. See also Torres v. Fiol, 110 Il. App. 3d 9, 10,441 N.E.2d 1300,
1301 (1982).
323. See, e.g., Turnerv. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F Supp. 451, 476 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (sitting by
designation):
Corporations and partnerships, both of which are fictional legal persons, obviously cannot
appear for themselves personally. With regard to these two types of business associations, the long
standing and consistent court interpretation[s]. . . [are] that they must be represented by licensed
counsel. . . . Corporations and partnerships, by their very nature, are unable to represent
themselves and the consistent interpretation . . . is that the only proper representative of a
corporation or a partnership is a licensed attorney, not an unlicensed layman regardless of how
close his association with the partnership or corporation.
324. See, e.g., CJC Canon 5(F).
884
Vol. 61:823, 1986
Overview of Rules of Professional Conduct
the presence of the supervising lawyer. However, the lawyer must be
present if the intern is to participate in superior court or court of appeals
proceedings (including depositions).325
An attorney must use great care if she attempts to practice another
profession simultaneously with the practice of law. She cannot hold herself
out as a specialist in the nonlegal area in any advertisement, office sign, or
other public communication which relates to her practice of law.326 How-
ever, academic degrees, as opposed to professional licenses, may be
included in advertisements or the lawyer's letterhead. 327
Rule 5.6 Restrictions on Right to Practice
Noncompetition partnership, employment, or settlement agreements, re-
stricting the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship,
except agreements concerning benefits upon retirement, are prohibited.328
TITLE VI. PUBLIC SERVICE
Rule 6.1 Pro Bono Publico Service
While the rules do not require a lawyer to provide public interest legal
services, she should render these services for the benefit of the community
whenever possible to ensure that legal representation is not denied to
persons of limited means.329
325. ADMIsSION TO PRACTIcE RuLEs Rule 9.
326. See Survey Comment, Lawyer Advertising, supra note 3.
327. See CPR DR 2-102(E), (F). The continuing validity of this DR is questionable in light ofIn re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982). See generally infra notes 350-53 and accompanying text.
328. RPC Rule 5.6(a)-(b). Model Rule 5.6 comment states:
An agreement restricting the right of partners or associates to practice after leaving a firm not
only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer.
Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements except for restrictions incident to provisions concerning
retirement benefits for service with the firm.
Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with
settling a claim on behalf of a client.
329. RPC Rule 6.1. The Rule also provides: "A lawyer may discharge this responsibility by
providing professional services at no fee or a reduced fee to persons of limited means or to public service
or charitable groups or organizations, by service in activities for improving the law, the legal system or
the legal profession, and by financial support for organizations that provide legal services to persons of
limited means." Model Rule 6.1 comment states:
The basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon
the individual lawyer, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of
the most rewarding experiences in the life ofalawyer. Every lawyer, regardless of professional prom-
inence orprofessional workload, should find time to participate in orotherwise support theprovision
of legal services to the disadvantaged. An ABA Committee has defined public interest law as legal
services offered at a substantially reduced or no fee in the areas of poverty law, civil rights law,
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Rule 6.2 Accepting Appointments
While all lawyers have the qualified freedom to choose whom they wish
to represent, a lawyer may not seek to avoid appointments by a tribunal to
representation of charitable organizations and efforts toward improving the justice system.
See ABA Special Committee on Public Interest Practice, Recommendations (Aug. 1975), reprinted in
Awarding Attorneys' Fees: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin-
istration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1975) (statement of
Charles A. Hobbs). When representing the "public interest," it is sometimes difficult for an attorney to
separate his own notions of means and priorities from those of his client.
In public interest practice, an attorney is likely to have as his client an individual or group
representing a public interest extending well beyond the client's own immediate sphere of concern.
If, having undertaken a given case, a public interest lawyer discovers that his client wants it
handled in a fashion the attorney believes antithetical to the broad public interest involved, serious
conflict may arise. For example, the lawyer may wish to press a case to a conclusion in order to
establish an important precedent; the client may decide that what he wants is a quick out-of-court
settlement. In most such cases the lawyer's duty to his client will clearly be paramount; in some
instances, however-as where the client's wishes are capricious-the solution to such a conflict
may lie in the lawyer's excusing himself from further service of his client in the case. But this
course has obvious disadvantages, not merely for the lawyer himself but also for his client, who
presumably retained him in the reasonable expectation that his service would be rendered
throughout the duration of the suit. In the final analysis, perhaps the only way of coping with the
problem is for the lawyer to be as candid as possible with his client from the outset of the case about
his view of the meaning of the case and the strategies which should be employed.
Halpern & Cunningham, Reflections on the New Public Interest Law: Theory and Practice at the Center
for Law and Social Policy, 59 GEO. L.J. 1095, 1109-10 (1971).
In addition, ethical problems of conflict of interest, lawyer as witness, solicitation, and advancement
of costs and expenses, are of particular concern to public interest lawyers involved in class action litiga-
tion. See Underwood, LegalEthics and ClassActions: Problems, Tactics andJudiciaResponses, 71 KY.
L.J. 787 (1982-83). One particular problem arises when the lawyerhimself both seeks to be the lawyerfor
the class and the class representative. It must be recognized that the attorney in majorclass actions is likely
to receive more, by way of legal fees, than any of the class action members will receive as their pro rata
share of any recovery. In Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985), the Supreme Court held that settlement
offers that lump together in a single figure damages and costs (including attorneys' fees in actions brought
under statutes that define "costs" to include attorneys' fees) are valid under FED. R. Ctv. P. 68.
Consequently, because of the temptation placed on the attorney to settle the matteron terms less favorable
to the class in an effort to obtain a large legal fee, the vast majority of courts forbid a lawyer for the class
from being the class representative. Underwood, supra, at 791-94 (and cases cited therein). See, e.g., In
re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action, 93 N.J. 412,439,461 A.2d 736,750 (1983). InJeffD. v. Evans, 743 F.2d
648 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985), the court held that Idaho officials would have to
pay fees to a lawyer despite his agreement to forego a fee award. The agreement on fees was part of the
settlement of a class action the lawyer brought to improve conditions for mentally retarded children in
state institutions. The court held that the defense request that the lawyer waive fees put his interests in
conflict with those of his client. The conflict was heightened in the case because the plaintiffs sought only
injunctive relief, not money damages that could be shared with the lawyer.
The crux of the problem is the possibility of diverging interests of the lawyer and the class. The
attorney may be tempted with a generous fee offer as a quid pro quo for a less than optimal
settlement. Alternatively, the defendant may condition settlement on the attorney's waiver of fees,
creating a particularly severe conflict when important interests of class members are at stake.
Jeff D., 743 F.2d at 652. For a discussion of problems in obtaining compensation in public interest
litigation, analysis of statutory and judicially-created awards, and a listing of federal fee statutes, see R.
ARONSON, supra note 7 1, at 119-62.
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represent any person except for good cause.330 Examples of "good cause"
for avoiding or refusing appointment include331 situations where
representing the client is likely to result in violation of the RPC 3 3 2 where
representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden
on the lawyer;333 or where "the client or the cause is so repugnant to the
lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's
ability to represent the client. ",334
330. RPC Rule 6.2. As indicated by Model Rule 6.2 comment:
A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards
as repugnant. The lawyer's freedom to select clients is, however, qualified. All lawyers have a
responsibility to assist in providing pro bono publico service. See Rule 6.1. An individual lawyer
fulfills this responsibility by accepting a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular
clients. A lawyer may also be subject to appointment by a court to serve unpopular clients or
persons unable to afford legal services.
An issue of recent concern involves the question of whether a court may compel an attorney to engage in
pro bono representation for no fee. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Superior Court, No. B004588, slip op.
(Ventura Cty. Super. Ct., Feb. 6, 1986) (court order to perform pro bono representation without
compensation denied attorney equal protection of the law); Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985):
We deem it admirable for either individual attorneys or associations of attorneys to volunteer pro
bono legal representation and strongly urge the continuation of such commendable practices. It is
both permissible and proper for voluntary associations of attorneys to condition membership upon
members doing a certain amount of pro bono representation and courts may appoint such attorneys
in civil cases as well as any other attorneys who volunteer and agree to serve without compensa-
tion. The courts of this state have not inherent power to appoint or compel attorneys to serve in civil
actions without compensation. Providing for such representation and the funding thereof is a
matter for legislative action.
Id. at 769. Arguments that uncompensated compelled appointments are an involuntary servitude in
violation of the thirteenth amendment have been uniformly rejected as without merit, however. See,
e.g., Bradshaw v. United States Dist. Ct., 742 F.2d 515, 517 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984); Family Div. Trial
Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 704-05 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See generally Fisch, Coercive Appoint-
ments of Counsel in Civil Cases in Forma Pauperis: An Easy Case Makes Hard Law, 50 Mo. L. REv.
527 (1985); Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 735 (1980).
331. Model Rule 6.2 comment states:
Good cause exists if the lawyer could not handle the matter competently, see Rule 1.1, or if
undertaking the representation would result in an improper conflict of interest, for example, when
the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer
relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client. A lawyer may also seek to decline an
appointment if acceptance would be unreasonably burdensome, for example, when it would
impose a financial sacrifice so great as to be unjust.
For a case reversing an attorney's six-month suspension for refusing to retract his expression of
"disgust" at the Eighth Circuit's allegedly excessive documentation requirement and inadequate
compensation for representing indigent criminal defendants in federal court, see In re Snyder, 105 S.
Ct. 2874 (1985).
332. RPC Rule 6.2(a).
333. RPC Rule 6.2(b).
334. RPC Rule 6.2(c).
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Rule 6.3 Membership in Legal Services Organization
A lawyer may participate in a legal services organization despite its
service to clients with interests adverse to a client of the lawyer or her firm,
so long as the lawyer's obligations to the client under RPC Rule 1.7
(conflict of interest) would not be compromised, 335 and there is no like-
lihood of "a material adverse effect on the representation of a client of the
organization whose interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer." 336
Rule 6.4 Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests
A lawyer is not prohibited from participating in law reform activities that
may affect a client's interests. 337 However, when the lawyer knows that the
interests of a client will be materially benefited, she should disclose that
fact to the organization or agency seeking the reform, but need not disclose
the identity of the client.338
TITLE VII. INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES
A number of recent decisions have caused the ABA and Washington
State Bar Association to reformulate their restrictions regarding attorneys'
advertising. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,339 the Court banned mini-
mum fee schedules and declared lawyers acting in their commercial capaci-
ties to be subject to antitrust regulation; and, in Bigelow v. Virginia,340 the
Court found certain commercial advertising prohibited by statute to be
within the protection of the first amendment.
In Bates v. State Bar ofArizona, 341 the Court balanced attorney advertis-
ing and "the dangers of suppressing information" against "the dangers
arising from its free flow," and resolved the issue in favor of permitting
attorney advertising. The limits of Bates and the extent of permissible
335. RPC Rule 6.3(a).
336. RPC Rule 6.3(b). Model Rule 6.3 comment states:
Lawyers should be encouraged to support and participate in legal service organizations. A
lawyer who is an officer or a member of such an organization does not thereby have a client-lawyer
relationship with persons served by the organization. However, there is potential conflict between
the interests of such persons and the interests of the lawyer's clients. If the possibility of such
conflict disqualified a lawyer from serving on the board of a legal services organization, the
profession's involvement in such organizations would be severely curtailed.
337. See RPC Rule 6.4.
338. RPC Rule 6.4.
339. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
340. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
341. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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attorney advertising are still subject to debate. 342 Under Bates, not all
advertising is permitted. First, there is no first amendment protection for an
advertisement that is false or misleading. 343 Second, the Court noted in
Bates that, "under some circumstances," regulation might be permitted
with respect to claims of quality which cannot be verified (i.e., "best trial
lawyer in the state"). 344 In addition, the Court suggested some restrictions
as to "taste," but the dimensions of this restriction are as yet unresolved.
345
These decisions, along with substantial input from the legal community,
have led to the formulation of the guidelines found in RPC Rules 7.1 to 7.5.
In addition, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,346 discussed in-
fra,347 has clarified the standard and its applicability in several areas, along
with the distinction between advertising and solicitation.
348
Rule 7.1 Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services
The RPC reflect the growing concern of the courts and the legal profes-
sion for dissemination of information to members of the public, so that they
might make an informed decision as to their options concerning legal
representation. 349 A lawyer may never "make a false or misleading com-
munication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services."350 This Rule covers
communications made directly to a party, as well as those representations
made through advertising. A communication is false or misleading if: (1) it
"contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact
necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially
misleading;"'351 or (2) "is likely to create an unjustified expectation about
results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can
achieve results by means that violate the rules of professional conduct or
other law." 352 For example, a lawyer who advertises the fact that he does
342. See Survey Comment, Lawyer Advertising, supra note 3.
343. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. at 383. See infra RPC Rule 7.1 at notes 350-53.
344. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84.; RPC Rule 7.1(c).
345. See Survey Comment, Lawyer Advertising, supra note 3; In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
346. 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
347. See infra notes 371-76 and accompanying text.
348. See Survey Comment, Lawyer Advertising, supra note 3.
349. SeeBates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Zaudererv. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105
S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
350. RPC Rule 7.1 (emphasis added). See Bates, 433 U.S. 350;In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
351. RPCRule 7.1(a). See, e.g., Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at2273, 2282-84 (advertising offerto refund
legal fees of client convicted of drunk driving and to represent civil litigants on a contingent fee basis
failed to disclose, respectively, the possibility of plea bargaining and the clients' liability for court
costs).
352. RPC Rule 7.1(b). As stated in Model Rule 7.1 comment:
The prohibition in paragraph (b) of statements that may create "unjustified expectations" would
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personal injury work, stating that his past three clients have recovered over
$500,000 each, may create the inference that the lawyer always wins large
settlements for his clients, regardless of the merits or extent of their
injuries. A communication is also false or misleading if it "compares the
lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the comparison can
be factually substantiated. 353
Rule 7.2 Advertising
RPC Rule 7.2 permits lawyers to advertise their services through public
media, including newspaper, telephone directory, legal directory,
periodical, outdoor, radio, television, and written communications, so
long as the communications do not constitute solicitation as defined in RPC
Rule 7.3.354 There are, however, several requirements with which attorneys
must comply. First, a copy or recording of the advertisement or written
communication must be kept for at least two years after it has been used. 355
Along with this copy, the lawyer must keep a record of where and when it
was used. 356 Second, the name of at least one lawyer responsible for the
content of the advertisment or communication must be stated in the
communication. 357
Third, a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of advertising, including the
usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal
ordinarily preclude advertisements about results obtained on behalf of a client, such as the amount
of a damage award or the lawyer's record in obtaining favorable verdicts, and advertisements
containing client endorsements. Such information may create the unjustified expectation that
similar results can be obtained for others without reference to the specific factual and legal
circumstances.
353. RPC Rule 7.1(c). See also Penn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. No. 85-170 (1985) (claims using subjective terms such as "experienced,"
"expert," "highly qualified," or "competent" are difficult for a nonlawyer to confirm, measure or
verify, are inherently misleading, and should, therefore, be barred) (citing Spencer v. Honorable
Justices, 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 760 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1985)).
354. RPC Rule 7.2(a). The Rule thus permits
public dissemination of information concerning a lawyer's name or firm name, address, and
telephone number; the kinds of services the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the lawyer's
fees are determined, including prices for specific services and payment and credit arrangements; a
lawyer's foreign language ability; names of references and, with their consent, names of clients
regularly represented; and other information that might invite the attention of those seeking legal
assistance.
Model Rule 7.2 comment. In addition, the Rule removes the prohibition against "undignified"
advertising. See id.
355. RPC Rule 7.2(b).
356. Id. However, the Rule does not require that advertising be subject to review prior to
dissemination. "Such a requirement would be burdensome and expensive relative to its possible
benefits, and may be of doubtful constitutionality." Model Rule 7.2 comment.
357. RPC Rule 7.2(d).
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service organization.358 An attorney may not, however, pay any form of
compensation, or make gifts or loans, to any layperson or lawyer in return
for the referral of a case or client.359 This rule applies to all cases, even if the
layperson was not requested by the attorney to refer cases to him, and even
if there was no agreement that any compensation would be paid.360 The
reasoning for the rule is that if laypersons were to receive compensation for
referrals, a market system would develop in Which laypersons would refer
clients and cases to attorneys on the basis of the size of payments made as
opposed to the competency of the lawyer. In addition, the practice would
create a risk of misrepresentation and undue influence, and, unlike adver-
tising, there would be no permanent record available for review.
Rule 7.3 Direct Contact with Prospective Clients
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment unless the person
being contacted is a former client or a relative.361 The reason for this rule is
that direct solicitation may be "fraught with the possibility of undue
influence, intimidation and over-reaching. 362 In-person encounters, un-
like advertising, may exert undue pressure and often demand immediate
response, without providing the opportunity for comparison or reflection.
Direct solicitation includes contact in person, by telephone or telegraph, by
letter or other writing,363 or by other communication directed to a specific
358. RPC Rule 7.2(c).
359. Id. "This restriction does not prevent an organization or person other than the lawyer from
advertising or recommending the lawyer's services. Thus, a legal aid agency or prepaid legal services
plan may pay to advertise legal services provided under its auspices." Model Rule 7.2 comment.
360. See, e.g., In re Carroll, 124 Ariz. 80, 602 P.2d 461 (1979) (impermissible for attorney to
"ratify" referrals by third parties by continued acceptance of such referrals and provision of special
credit treatment and cash). Cf. In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981) (no evidence that attorneys'
providing referring party information for research was conditioned on or given as compensation for
referral of cases to the firm).
361. RPC Rule 7.3.
362. Model Rule 7.3 comment. See also Ohralik v. State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,464-65 (1978).
363. But see supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text; Survey Comment, Lawyer Advertising,
supra note 3. According to Model Rule 7.3 comment, the justification for banning solicitation by mail,
rather than permitting it as a form of advertising, is as follows:
Direct mail solicitation cannot be effectively regulated by means less drastic than outright
prohibition. One proposed safeguard is to require that the designation "Advertising" be stamped
on any envelope containing a solicitation letter. This would do nothing to assure the accuracy and
reliability of the contents. Another suggestion is that solicitation letters be filed with a state
regulatory agency. This would be ineffective as a practical matter. State lawyer discipline agencies
struggle for resources to investigate specific complaints, much less for those necessary to screen
lawyers' mail solicitation material.
It should be noted, however, that the ABA's Commission on Advertising decided on October 18,
1985, to propose amendments to ABA Model Rule 7.3 that would permit targeted mail advertising. In
addition, Pennsylvania's Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, one of the first
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recipient. 364 A lawyer may, however, distribute information, circulars and
advertisments to persons who are generally "not known to need legal
services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who
are so situated that they might in general find such services useful.",365
However, it may be solicitation for a lawyer to accept employment at the
request of an individual if the lawyer has volunteered specific legal advice
to that person when she was not his client at that time. The United States
Supreme Court has stated that in-person solicitation for financial gain,
under circumstances likely to result in harm to the client, may be constitu-
tionally proscribed. 366
Exceptions to the rule against direct solicitation do exist in some circum-
stances. Solicitation is permitted when the individual to whom the advice
was volunteered is a close friend, relative, or former client. 367 Suppose, for
example, that attorney X originally represented A and B in setting up their
business. Due to the nature of the law at the time, the business was set up as
a partnership. X later calls B to inform her of a change in the law that would
make a corporation more advantageous. X may accept employment if A and
B ask him to incorporate the business. A lawyer may also accept employ-
ment resulting from educational activities conducted or sponsored by a
qualified legal assistance organization, so long as those educational activi-
ties were not designed to promote publicity or employment for particular
lawyers. 368 Further, solicitation motivated by political goals, at least when
on behalf of a nonprofit organization engaging in a form of political
expression, may be disciplined only when it actually produces the harm
state bar association committees to recommend adoption of the ABA Model Rules, recently rejected the
Model Rule 7.3 ban on targeted mail solicitation. Penn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. No. 85-170 (1985) ("Those states that have considered Rule
7.3 have rejected it in favor of the more liberal provisions contained in the original Kutak Commission
proposals, which would permit direct mailings so long as the written communications are neither false
nor misleading, subject to certain very limited exceptions.").
364. RPC Rule 7.3.
365. RPC Rule 7.3 (emphasis added). As stated in Model Rule 7.3 comment:
General mailings not speaking to a specific matter do not pose the same danger of abuse as
targeted mailings, and therefore are not prohibited by this Rule. The representations made in such
mailings are necessarily general rather than tailored, less importuning than informative. They are
addressed to recipients unlikely to be specially vulnerable at the time, hence who are likely to be
more skeptical about unsubstantiated claims. General mailings not addressed to recipients in-
volved in a specific legal matter or incident, therefore, more closely resemble permissible
advertising rather than prohibited solicitation.
But see supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text; Survey Comment, Lawyer Advertising, supra note
3.
366. Ohralik v. State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
367. See RPC Rule 7.3.
368. See CPR DR 2-104(A)(2), (4). With respect to in-person solicitation, the basic principle is
probably still applicable.
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that the regulation seeks to prevent, such as improper coercion or misrepre-
sentation.369 Likewise, "collective activity undertaken to obtain mean-
ingful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of
the First Amendment," and may not be punished or prohibited. 370
"Targeted" advertising is a final exception to the rule against direct
solicitation. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,371 an attorney
took out newspaper advertisements asking women readers whether they
had used the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, advising that they might
have legal recourse, and suggesting that the attorney would handle their
cases on a contingent fee basis wherein "no legal fees are owed." The
Court overturned Ohio's discipline of the attorney for improper solicita-
tion. The Court reiterated the following test: "Commercial speech that is
not false or deceptive . . . may be restricted only in the service of a
substantial government interest, and only through means that directly
advance that interest." 372 In addition, the Court held unobjectionable the
fact that the advertising was "geared to persons with a specific legal
problem" and that it contained the legal advice that such persons might
have a valid legal claim. 373
Despite the fact that the advertisement possessed all the elements of
solicitation except personal contact, the Court stated that the "advertise-
ment-and print advertising generally-poses much less risk" than in-
person solicitation, and lacks "the coercive force of the personal presence
of a trained advocate. '374 However, the Court upheld reasonable disclosure
requirements, for example, that an advertisement about contingent fee
retainers must disclose whether the client would be liable for court costs. 37 5
Although "unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements
might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial
speech . . . an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as
disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in
preventing deception of 'consumers'. "376
369. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
370. United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576,585-86 (1971) (upholding Union's payment
of investigators to actively solicit injured members to employ certain attorneys under contingent fee
arrangements). See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
371. 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985). See also Survey Comment, Lawyer Advertising, supra note 3.
372. Id. at 2275.
373. Id. at 2277.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 2282-84.
376. Id. at 2282.
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Rule 7.4 Communication of Fields of Practice
A lawyer is permitted to communicate the fact that he does or does not
practice in particular fields of law. 377 The communication of this informa-
tion does not necessarily imply special competence in any particular
area. 37 8 The "permissible statements" approach, whereby state bar asso-
ciations allowed only those statements expressly permitted in the associa-
tions' advertising rules or that were expressly approved by state bar au-
thorities on a case-by-case basis, was invalidated in In re R.M.J.379
Whereas the Model Rule version of Rule 7.4 permits a lawyer to represent
himself as a specialist in the fields of patent and admiralty, and provides
that a state may designate any other area of specialty, Washington only
allows an attorney to represent himself as specializing in patent law if he is
377. RPC Rule 7.4. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
378. For that reason, Model Rule 7.4 comment, provides that "stating that the lawyer is a
,specialist' or that the lawyer's practice 'is limited to' or 'concentrated in' particular fields is not
permitted. . .[Ulse of these terms may be misleading unless the lawyer is certified or recognized in
accordance with procedures in the state where the lawyer is licensed to practice." See Zimmerman v.
Office of Grievance Committees, 79 A.D.2d 263, 267 App. A., 438 N.Y.S.2d 400, 404 App. A.,
appeal dismissed, 53 N.Y.2d 937,440 N.Y.S.2d 1029, 423 N.E.2d 416 (1981) (since purpose of listing
fields of practice was "to convey the impression that the advertising lawyers have a special expertise in
the area of law in which their name is listed," the disclaimer that the ad does not indicate any
certification of expertise therein is, at best, "ambiguous"); Lovett & Linder Ltd. v. Carter, 523 F. Supp.
903, 911 (D.R.I. 1981) ("Itlhe disclaimer type of ad is even more pernicious in that it deliberately states
an untruth, i.e., lack of expertise in areas in which the lawyer believes that he or she is a qualified
expert").
Misleading or deceptive advertising of fields of practice in a manner that appears to indicate expertise
may also result in liability under the Consumer Protection Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.86.010-.920
(1985). See Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d 52, 691 P.2d 163 (1984). WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020
(1985) provides: "Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct
of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful." Further, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.010(2)
(1985) states that "'Trade' and 'commerce' shall include the sale of assets or services, and any
commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of the state of Washington." In Short, the
Washington Supreme Court held that "certain entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law may fall
within the 'trade or commerce' definition of the CPA [Consumer Protection Act]." Id. at 60, 691 P.2d at
168. The "entrepreneurial aspects" of legal practice include "how the price of legal services is
determined, billed, and collected and the way a law firm obtains, retains, and dismisses clients." Id. at
61, 691 P.2d at 168. Clearly, then, an attorney's advertising for legal business would be subject to the
CPA, with its provision for attorney's fees and potential treble damages. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.86.090 (1985). In addition, it has been persuasively argued that, when a lawyer advertises fields of
practice or that her practice is limited to certain areas, the listing implies that the lawyer is better than
those not listed "and further implies a factual representation of experience." Devine, Letting the Market
Control Advertising by Lawyers: A Suggested Remedy for the Misled Client, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 351,
372-74 (1982). Therefore, the lawyer should be held to a specialist's degree of care for purposes of
malpractice liability. Id.
379. 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (overturning discipline of an attorney for advertising "personal injury"
and "real estate" fields of practice, instead of "torts" and "property" as required by state bar rules).
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admitted to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office.380
Rule 7.5 Firm Names and Designations
Lawyers in private practice may not use a trade name.381 A law firm may,
however, continue to use the names of members who are retired or de-
ceased. 382 Lawyers may also use the term "legal clinic" in the name of the
firm, alone, in conjunction with a geographical location, or with the name
of one or more members of the firm, so long as the name is not misleading,
and does not raise unjustified expectations. 383 Thus, one Alabama lawyer,
with offices on University Boulevard near the University of Alabama-
Birmingham, changed the firm name to "University Legal Center." The
court held the name was deceptive because the lawyer had no affiliation
with the university, and the general public was likely to associate the lawyer
with the university.384
A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same
firm name in each jurisdiction.385 However, when identifying its lawyers
the firm must list the jurisdictional limitations of those lawyers not licensed
to practice in that jurisdiction. 386 If a member of a firm holds a public
office, the firm may not use her name in the firm name or any communica-
tions during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and
regularly practicing with the firm. 387 Finally, "[lawyers may state or imply
380. For analysis and criticism of Washington's departure from Model Rule 7.4, see Survey
Comment, Lawyer Advertising, supra note 3.
381. RPC Rule 7.5(a). See also Survey Comment, Lawyer Advertising, supra note 3.
382. RPC Rule 7.5(a). Model Rule 7.5 comment states:
It may be observed that any firm name including the name of a deceased partner is, strictly
speaking, a trade name. The use of such names to designate law firms has proven a useful means of
identification. However, it is misleading to use the name of a lawyer not associated with the firm or
a predecessor of the firm.
383. See RPC Rule 7.5(a); Model Rule 7.5 comment.
384. Mezrano v. Alabama Bar, 434 So. 2d 732, 736 (Ala. 1983). See also In re Oldtowne Legal
Clinic, P.A., 285 Md. 132,400 A.2d 1111 (1979) (finding "The Oldtowne Legal Clinic" impermissi-
ble); In re Shepard, 92 A.D.2d 978,459 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1983) (finding "The People's Law Firm of Jan
L. Shepard, Attorney P.C." impermissible). Cf. Florida Bar v. Fetterman, 439 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1983)
("The Law Team, Fetterman and Associates" permissible); In re Shannon, 292 Or. 339, 638 P.2d 482
(1982) ("Shannon and Johnson's Hollywood Law Center" permissible).
385. RPC Rule 7.5(b).
386. Id. See, e.g., New York Crim. & Civ. Bar v. Jacoby, 92 A.D.2d 817, 460 N.Y.S.2d 309
(1983), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 130,472 N.Y.S.2d 890,460 N.E.2d 1325 (1984) (use of the name "Jacoby &
Meyers" not violative of New York prohibitions on unauthorized practice of law where letterhead listed
name of New York partner first and indicated after the names of both Jacoby and Meyers that they were
licensed in California only).
387. RPC Rule 7.5(c).
Washington Law Review
that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is
the fact." 388
TITLE VIII. MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE
PROFESSION
Given the unique nature of the legal profession in society, every lawyer is
obligated to assist in the improvement of the legal system and to assure that
the profession itself is not brought into disrepute. Many of the provisions in
the RPC attempt to promote this concept in the course of regulating
relationships with a client. In addition, the provisions in Title VIII are
designed specifically to give substance to the lawyer's obligations to the
legal system and the profession. When explicit ethical guidelines do not
exist to control a lawyer's conduct, he should determine his conduct in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of
the legal profession.
Rule 8.1 Bar Admission Matters
In regulating admission to practice, each jurisdiction has formulated
certain prerequisites. While the details of satisfying them vary by state and
federal district, the applicant normally must meet educational require-
ments, pass a bar examination (except where waived in certain jurisdic-
tions), and demonstrate that he or she is a person of good moral charac-
ter.389 But in order to satisfy constitutional requirements under the
privileges and immunities, due process, and equal protection clauses, any
prerequisite "must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or
capacity to practice law." 390
Educational requirements vary widely among the states. Washington
requires an undergraduate degree plus graduation from an ABA accredited
388. RPC Rule 7.5(d). Model Rule 7.5 comment states, with respect to this Rule, that "lawyers
sharing office facilities, but who are not in fact partners, may not denominate themselves as, for
example, 'Smith and Jones,' for that title suggests partnership in the practice of law."
389. See, e.g., APR 3(a), 4. Courts have uniformly concluded that the bar examination, including
both essay and multiple-choice (as in the Multistate Bar Examination) questions, is rationally related to
determination of competency of an individual practioner. This is true even though the results of prior
examinations show a higher failure rate for minority groups. See, e.g., Delgado v. McTighe, 522 F.
Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1981). It has been held that bar examiners need have no ascertainable grading
standard for evaluating examinations, particularly the essay portion of the examination. Bowens v.
Board of Law Examiners, 57 N.C. App. 78,291 S.E.2d 170 (1982). However, equal protection requires
that applicants with identical scores be given the same treatment, that is, either passed or failed. See,
e.g., In re Randolph-Seng, 669 P.2d 400 (Utah 1983).
390. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
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law school. 391 Under very stringent requirements, Washington will allow
the substitution of a legal clerkship in place of the formal legal study.392
A state may not require that an applicant be a citizen of the United
States. 393 Residency requirements are found in some, but not all states, and
there is some disagreement in the courts as to their constitutional validity.
A six-month requirement prior to practicing in the state was upheld on the
ground that the period was reasonable and necessary for the purpose of
investigating the morals and character of the applicant. 394 But in Supreme
Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,395 the Court held that New Hampshire's
requirement of residency, or the expressed intent to become a resident at the
time of swearing in, violated the privileges and immunities clause. 396 The
Court found that there was not a "substantial reason" for the residency
requirement and that the total prohibition of nonresidents did not bear a
substantial relationship to the objectives of the state. 397
Every jurisdiction places on each applicant the burden of showing that he
or she possesses "good moral character." 398 Each applicant is required to
answer a detailed background questionnaire and to furnish references. 399
Refusal to furnish this information is a sufficient ground for rejection of the
applicant.400 For example, it has been held that an applicant who refused to
answer questions concerning his possible membership in the Communist
Party could be rejected because such inquiries are merely a prelude to an
investigation into his moral character. 4°1 This is true regardless of whether
affirmative answers would justify denial of admission. 40 2
391. APR 3(b)(2); APR 6(a)(2). See In re Schatz, 80 Wn. 2d 604,497 P.2d 153 (1972) (State Bar
not required under Constitution to give "full faith and credit" to California accreditation process; denial
of non-ABA, California-accredited law school graduate's right to sit for the Washington bar examina-
tion upheld).
392. APR 3(b)(2), APR 6.
393. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). See APR 3(b)(1) (a person must be either "(i) a citizen of
the United States, or (ii) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in accordance with federal
immigration and naturalization law").
394. Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F Supp. 257, aff'd, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972).
395. 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985).
396. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
397. Id. See also Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 620 P.2d 640 (Alaska 1980) (invalidating, under the
privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2, a durational residency requirement that all
applicants to the Alaska bar be a resident of the state for a 30-day period prior to taking the bar
examination).
398. See, e.g., APR 3(a), 5(a).
399. See APR 3(d).
400. See APR 7(b).
401. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
402. Id. SeeBaird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (refusal to disclosemere "memberships" ormere
"beliefs" cannot be used for exclusion, but questions regarding memberships or beliefs can be asked as
preliminary to further inquiry). See also In re Brooks, 57 Wn. 2d 66, 355 P.2d 840 (1960) (applicant's
conviction for resisting draft sufficient basis for denial of application).
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Lawyers are subject to discipline if they make a materially false repre-
sentation, 40 3 or knowingly fail to disclose a material fact requested in
connection with an application for admission, unless the information is
confidential under RPC Rule 1.6.404 An applicant is entitled to procedural
due process with regard to actions taken by the bar representatives review-
ing his application. This includes the right to a hearing before the bar
committee and confrontation of adverse witnesses, as well as the right to
judicial review of the denial of an application based on bad moral charac-
ter.40
5
The purpose of the bar committee's investigation into the background of
an applicant is to determine if there is anything in her past which reflects
adversely upon her honesty and integrity, i.e., whether any of the appli-
cant's past conduct involved "moral turpitude, '40 6 which is defined as
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. 407 A variety
of illegal acts, such as draft evasion and possession of marijuana for
personal use, may or may not be acts involving "moral turpitude," depend-
ing upon the nature of the offense and the intent of the individual. 40 8 For
403. RPC Rule 8.1(a).
404. RPC Rule 8.1(b). In addition, the Rule provides that a lawyer may not "fail to disclose a fact
necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter." Model Rule
8.1 comment states:
The duty imposed by this Rule extends to persons seeking admission to the bar as well as to
lawyers. Hence, if a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application for
admission, it may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action if the person is admitted, and in
any event may be relevant in a subsequent admission application. The duty imposed by this Rule
applies to a lawyer's own admission or discipline as well as that of others.
405. See, e.g., Martin B. v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 33 Cal. 3d 717, 661 P.2d 160, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 610 (1983). See also APR 5(d).
406. See, e.g., In re Wright, 102 Wn. 2d 855, 858, 690 P.2d 1134, 1136 (1984) (quoting In re
G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 458 (Fla. 1978)):
In our view, a finding of a lack of "good moral character" should not be restricted to those acts
that reflect moral turpitude. A more appropriate definition of the phrase requires an inclusion of
acts and conduct which would cause a reasonable man to have substantial doubts about an
individual's honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of the state and
nation.
407. See In re Hopkins, 54 Wash. 569, 572, 103 P. 805 (1909) (in context of disciplinary
proceeding). Hopkins has been cited repeatedly as establishing the standard for moral turpitude in
Washington. See, e.g., In re Fortun, 97 Wn. 2d 240, 643 P.2d 447, 448 (1982).
408. Examples from recent cases include: Cord v. Gibb, 219 Va. 1019, 254 S.E.2d 71 (1979)
(sharing ownership of home with person of opposite sex to whom applicant was not married held to be
unorthodox, but not rationally related to fitness to practice law); In re Beasley, 243 Ga. 134,252 S.E.2d
615 (1979) (admission may be denied for failure to fulfill legal obligation of paying past due child
support); In re Eimers, 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978) (society's interest in having honest lawyers not
threatened merely because of applicant's homosexual orientation). Compare In re Groot, 365 So. 2d 164
(Fla. 1978) (applicant cannot be denied admission for asserting valid legal rights, such as filing
bankruptcy), with In re Fitzpatrick, 247 Ga. 55, 273 S.E.2d 618 (1981) (failure to disclose such
information on bar application justification for denial of admission) and In re G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454
(Fla. 1978) (when circumstances surrounding the filing of bankruptcy raise serious questions about
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example, an applicant who used aliases to hide his Jewish background from
employers, and who had been arrested along with other discontented
laborers, was found not to have committed an act of "moral turpitude." 40 9
Rule 8.2 Judicial and Legal Officials
The purpose of this Rule is to help maintain public confidence in the
administration of justice. Although lawyers should be encouraged to make
constructive suggestions and criticisms which would improve the admin-
istration of justice, false and inflammatory statements, comments, and
criticisms of judges and public officials should be discouraged. 410 A lawyer
may not make a statement known to be false, "or with reckless disregard as
to its truth or falsity," concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge,
public officer, or judicial candidate.411 Lawyers publicly criticizing judges
should be certain of their complaint, use appropriate language, and avoid
applicant's moral fitness, denial of admission appropriate). See also In re Walker, 112 Ariz. 134, 539
P.2d 891 (1975) (denial of admission for failure to register for the draft permissible, since such failure is
a felony), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 956 (1976); In re Willis, 288 N.C. 1,215 S.E.2d 771 (drunk driving
conviction, by itself, not indicative of poor moral character), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 976 (1975).
Even prior unlawful activity may not be sufficient to demonstratepresent unfitness if it was the result
of "youthful indiscretion" or the applicant has demonstrated exemplary behavior for a substantial
period of time following the unlawful conduct. See, e.g., Martin B. v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 33
Cal. 3d 717, 661 P.2d 160, 190 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1983). However, the fact that the unlawful conduct was
uncharged, or even resulted in an acquittal, will not necessarily prevent a finding of unfitness to
practice. Id. See RLD 1.1(a); In re Fortun, 97 Wn. 2d 240, 643 P.2d 447 (1982).
409. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
410. See Model Rule 8.2 comment. The Supreme Court has held that false statements about public
officals may be punished only if the speaker acts with knowledge that the statement is "false or with
reckless disregard of whetheritis falseornot." New YorkTimes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279-80
(1964); Note, In re Erdmann: What Lawyers Can Say About Judges, 38 ALB. L. REv. 600, 609-10
(1974) ("Since disciplinary actions against attorneys seem to constitute a serious deterrent to free
political discussion, it is arguable that such actions should be subject to the same constitutional
limitations as the Supreme Court has imposed in defamation actions.").
411. See RPC Rule 8.2(a). See, e.g., In re Donohoe, 90 Wn. 2d 173,580 P.2d 1093 (1978), where
the court responded to the lawyer's first amendment defense of a false advertising campaign against the
incumbent judge as follows:
We agree that a person does not surrender freedom of expression rights when becoming a
licensed attorney. . . . However, we do not believe that the First Amendment protects one who
utters a statement with knowledge of its falsity, even in the context of a judicial campaign. Such
speech is not beneficial to the public and is generally harmful to the person against whom it is
directed. . . . [The Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judicial candidate to maintain the
dignity appropriate to judicial office. . . .As a minimum, this places upon that person a burden
present regardless of his candidacy-to abide by the Code of Professional Responsibility,
including abstention from conduct involving dishonesty. . . . One who publishes a statement
with knowledge of its falsity during the course of a judicial campaign is subject to discipline
pursuant to [the Code].
Id. at 181-82, 580 P.2d at 1077. See also Comment, Ethical Conduct in a Judicial Campaign: Is
Campaigning an EthicalActivity?, 57 WASH. L. REv. 119, 135-37 (1981).
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petty criticism. 412 A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office must
comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 413
including those that preclude false or misleading campaign statements,
personal solicitation of funds, and any hints as to the rulings the judge
might make upon election. 414
Rule 8.3 Reporting Professional Misconduct
A lawyer has a duty to report a violation of the RPC by another attorney,
or the Code of Judicial Conduct by a judge, that "raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a law-
yer," 415 or the "judge's fitness for office. ", 416 As stated in the Commentary
to Model Rule 8.3:
This Rule limits the reporting obligation to those offenses that a self-regulat-
ing profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent. A measure of judgment
is, therefore, required in complying with the provisions of this Rule. The term
"substantial" refers to the seriousness of the possible offense and not the
quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware. A report should be made to
the bar disciplinary agency unless some other agency. . . is more appropri-
ate in the circumstances. Similar considerations apply to the reporting of
judicial misconduct. 417
Rule 8.4 Misconduct
In addition to violation of specific prohibitions contained in the seven
Titles of the RPC, an attorney may not:
(1) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly
assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;418
(2) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;419
412. See, e.g., In re Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764 (Iowa 1976); In re Shimek, 284 So. 2d 686 (Fla.
1973); see also RPC Rule 3.5.
413. RPC Rule 8.2(b).
414. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCt Canons 7(A)(i), 7(B)(1)(c), 7(B)(l)(d) & 7(B)(2).
415. RPC Rule 8.3(a).
416. RPC Rule 8.3(b).
417. However, the Rule "does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by rule
1.6." RPC Rule 8.3(c).
418. RPC Rule 8.4(a). Thus, for example, an attorney may not ask a secretary, paralegal, law
student, or client to engage in any conduct prohibited with respect to the lawyer; e.g., even though a
client may speak directly with an opposing party represented by a lawyer, see Model Rule 4.2 comment,
supra note 271, it would be improper for the attorney to instruct his client what to say to the opposing
party or to negotiate a settlement without consulting opposing counsel.
419. RPC Rule 8.4(b). Model Rule 8.4 comment states:
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses
900
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(3) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresenta-
tion;4 20
(4) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;421
(5) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or
official; 42 2 or
(6) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of
applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.423
Rule 8.5 Jurisdiction
A lawyer licensed or admitted for any purpose to practice in Washington
is subject to Washington's disciplinary authority, although engaged in
practice elsewhere.424
involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds
of offenge carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses
involving "moral turpitude." That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some
matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific
connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the
entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate
lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, or
breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A
pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can
indicate indifference to legal obligation.
Thus, inIn re McGrath, 98 Wn. 2d 337, 341,655 P.2d 232,234 (1982), the courtheld that a conviction
of assault with a deadly weapon is not, per se, a crime involving moral turpitude. A determination of
moral turpitude depends on whether the crime is one which offends common standards of honesty, good
morals, and justice which most people would follow without regard to whether the same conduct
happens to offend the criminal law. Id. at 342, 655 P.2d at 234. See also In re Fortun, 97 Wn. 2d 240,
643 P.2d 447 (1982) (growing and processing 25,000 pounds of marijuana plants is a "gross and
intentional violation of the law").
420. RPC Rule 8.4(c). See, e.g., In re Rosellini, 97 Wn. 2d 373, 646 P.2d 122 (1982); In re Krogh,
85 Wn. 2d 462, 536 P.2d 578 (1975). As stated in Model Rule 8.4 comment:
Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other
citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of
attorney. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor,
administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organiza-
tion.
421. RPC Rule 8.4(d).
422. RPC Rule 8.4(e).
423. RPC Rule 8.4(f).
424. RPC Rule 8.5. Model Rule 8.5 comment also states: "If the rules of professional conduct in
• . . two jurisdictions [in which a lawyer is licensed and practices] differ, principles of conflict of laws
may apply."

